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A GATE FOREVER CLOSED?  RETIRING 
IMMIGRATION LAW’S POST-DEPARTURE BAR 
Jonathan H. Ross* 
 
Immigration law’s “post-departure bar” destroys the jurisdiction of 
either an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals to hear a 
motion to reopen or reconsider filed by an alien who is no longer physically 
within the country.  This Note examines the current conflict between the 
federal circuits regarding the post-departure bar and why the circuits that 
have decided to strike down the bar in the cases before them have ruled in 
line with certain trends present in recent Supreme Court immigration cases. 
Conflict between the circuits has arisen because the governing statute, 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
was enacted without reference to the bar, which had been in place before 
the Act’s passage.  In that statutory silence, the Attorney General 
promulgated regulations intended to reestablish the bar.  In recent years, 
circuits have taken various positions on the bar’s validity.  Many have 
struck the bar down on the basis of either Chevron deference or the 
grounds outlined in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers, which bars an agency from limiting its jurisdiction 
in certain situations.  Still, other circuits have upheld the bar by using 
Chevron to conclude that deference to the agency is proper. 
This Note suggests that the circuits that have struck down the bar are in 
line with prevailing trends in recent immigration cases decided by the 
Supreme Court.  Further, this Note argues that it does not matter whether a 
circuit court relies upon Chevron or Union Pacific to strike down the bar, 
as the use of either precedent to attack the bar serves these trends, and is 
consistent with the overall direction of American immigration law. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION:  A TALE OF TWO IMMIGRANTS ..................................... 1052 
I.  THE POST-DEPARTURE BAR AND THE REGULATORY AND 
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF DEPORTATION .............................. 1053 
A.  The Post-departure Bar .......................................................... 1054 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2010, The Pennsylvania 
State University.  I would like to thank Professor Joseph Landau for his guidance and advice 
in the writing of this Note.  For my parents, in gratitude for their invaluable encouragement 
and support. 
 1052 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
1.  Motions to Reopen ........................................................... 1054 
2.  Motions to Reconsider ..................................................... 1055 
3.  The Post-departure Bar Generally.................................... 1055 
4.  1952–1990:  Beginnings of the Bar ................................. 1055 
5.  1990:  The Winds of Change Begin to Blow ................... 1056 
B.  Opening Up a Can of Worms:  IIRIRA ................................... 1057 
C.  Removal Proceedings in General ........................................... 1060 
D.  The Post-departure Bar in Action .......................................... 1062 
E.  Tools for Dismantling or Upholding the Bar:  
Chevron and Union Pacific ................................................... 1066 
F.  Immigration Law in the Past Decade ..................................... 1068 
II.  THE QUESTION OF THE POST-DEPARTURE BAR’S CURRENT 
VALIDITY ...................................................................................... 1072 
A.  Opening Salvos:  Lin Opens the Door .................................... 1073 
B.  Pena-Muriel and William:  Chevron Arrives on the Scene .... 1075 
C.  The Post-departure Bar Strikes Back ..................................... 1078 
D.  Union Pacific:  A New Weapon Against the Bar .................... 1082 
E.  Prestol Espinal:  A Return to Chevron? .................................. 1086 
F.  2012:  A Year of Further Steps for Chevron ........................... 1088 
III.  WHERE TWO FORKS OF THE ROAD MEET AGAIN ............................ 1090 
A.  Anti-Chevron:  An Agency Denied .......................................... 1091 
B.  Union Pacific:  Another Means to the Same End ................... 1092 
C.  Why Either Answer is Correct ................................................ 1093 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1094 
INTRODUCTION:  A TALE OF TWO IMMIGRANTS 
Two aliens live and work in the United States, one in Maryland, and the 
other in Massachusetts.  Both came to the United States illegally with their 
parents as young children, and both have resided in the country for several 
decades.  Both aliens eventually married American citizens, had children, 
and have been working steady jobs to support those families for a number 
of years.  However, neither alien formally completed the process to attain 
lawful permanent resident status and subsequent citizenship following their 
marriage.  Both aliens became tangentially involved in schemes to receive 
stolen credit cards, and both were wrongfully convicted.  Subsequently, 
while serving their jail sentence they are issued Notices to Appear before an 
immigration judge (IJ) in order to defend against their potential removal 
from the United States on the basis of their criminal conviction for fraud. 
Both are resident aliens who mistakenly fell in with the wrong crowds.  
Because they never went through the formal citizenship process, both may 
now have to leave their homes and families behind in America, or uproot 
them to a foreign land.  In each case, the IJ orders removal, and after failing 
to convince the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to reverse the order 
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during their appeals process, both aliens are removed from America to their 
countries of origin.  While overseas in their homelands, both file for vacatur 
of their conviction and are successful.  Innocent in the eyes of the criminal 
justice system, both file motions to reopen with the BIA.1 
Here, the fortunes of the two aliens diverge based on the jurisdiction in 
which each went through the removal process.  The BIA may grant the 
motion for the alien who resided in Maryland and may even overturn the 
order for removal.  In this scenario, the immigration court falls within the 
purview of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in William v. Gonzales,2 which struck 
down the regulatory “post-departure” bar.3  The immigrant residing in 
Massachusetts will not be so lucky.  Instead, due to the regulatory “post-
departure” bar4 promulgated by the Attorney General, the BIA will be 
deprived of jurisdiction to even hear the motion.5   
The current state of the post-departure bar is in flux, as the circuit courts 
have taken divergent positions on its continuing validity.6  In some circuits, 
like the Fourth, the post-departure bar is considered invalid.7  These courts 
invalidate the bar either through applying the framework of Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,8 or the principles of Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.9  
Meanwhile, in other circuits, such as the First, the bar still stands.10 
Part I gives an overview of the state of the post-departure bar.  Part II 
then examines the conflict and how the circuits have ruled on the bar’s 
validity.  Finally, Part III argues that it ultimately does not matter which 
ground reverses the bar, because either of the two major tools serves the 
norms that the Supreme Court has relied upon.  This comparison shows that 
the lifting of the post-departure bar is in line with the overall direction of 
the law. 
I.  THE POST-DEPARTURE BAR AND THE REGULATORY AND 
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF DEPORTATION 
Before diving into the array of cases that have been brought before the 
circuit courts regarding the post-departure bar’s validity, this Note 
considers the background of the bar itself and its place in the overall context 
of American immigration law.  This analysis begins in Part I.A by 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 2. 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 3. See id. at 333–34; infra notes 222–40. 
 4. This Note refers to the regulatory “post-departure” bar.   However, some courts and 
other scholarship refer to this bar just as the departure bar.  I have chosen to use the term 
“post-departure” for clarity, as the bar comes into effect after an alien’s departure from the 
United States. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra note 3. 
 8. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 9. 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009). 
 10. See infra notes 263–75. 
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discussing motions to reopen and reconsider in general, before moving into 
a discussion of the bar itself and its pre-1996 history.  Next, Part I.B 
discusses the history of the bar as it evolved from the common law to its 
modern form through repeated legislation and executive interpretation of 
that legislation.  Then, Part I.C examines how removal proceedings operate 
and the types of situations where the post-departure bar comes into play.  
Part I.D introduces the tools that the circuit courts have used to dismantle 
the bar:  Chevron and Union Pacific.  Finally, Part I.E details recent 
Supreme Court immigration decisions and the norms that the Court has 
relied on. 
A.  The Post-departure Bar 
The post-departure bar is a prohibition on the right of an alien to file a 
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider after physically leaving the 
borders of the United States.11  Essentially, the bar operates to deprive 
either the immigration court or the BIA of taking jurisdiction to consider 
the motion, as the alien, by having left the United States, is deemed to have 
“passed beyond” the agency’s control.12 
1.  Motions to Reopen 
A motion to reopen is “a form of procedural relief that ‘asks the Board to 
change its decision in light of newly discovered evidence or a change in 
circumstances since the hearing.’”13 Filing such motions will not 
automatically stay a removal order.14  An IJ will not grant a motion to 
reopen unless the IJ is satisfied that the evidence being offered is material, 
previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at 
the prior hearing.15 
Motions to reopen were initially created by federal judges before official 
codification.16  For example, a motion to reopen had appeared earlier in a 
1916 district court case.17  After much evolution, the current statutory 
 
 11. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (applying to motions filed with the BIA).  “A motion to 
reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the 
subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure 
from the United States.” Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (governing motions filed with an IJ). 
 12. See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 656 (B.I.A. 2008) (“Removed 
aliens have, by virtue of their departure, literally passed beyond our aid.”). 
 13. Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2315 (2008) (quoting 1 CHARLES GORDON, 
STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 3.05[8][c] (rev. ed. 2012)). See generally THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET 
AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:  PROCESS AND POLICY 1075–77 (6th ed. 2008) 
(discussing motions to reopen and reconsider). 
 14. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f).  An exception is if removal is ordered in absentia. See 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A). 
 15. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3).  These motions are disfavored due to the strong public 
interest in concluding litigation. See Tawadrous v. Holder, 565 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 16. See Dada, 128 S. Ct. at 2315. 
 17. See id. (citing Ex parte Chan Shee, 236 F. 579 (N.D. Cal. 1916)).  “The motion must 
state the new facts that will be proven at the hearing if the motion is granted . . . . [and] must 
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scheme as enacted by Congress provides the right to file such motions, 
while placing some strict time limits on filing, along with exceptions to the 
rule.18 
2.  Motions to Reconsider 
Alternatively, a motion to reconsider asks the BIA or an IJ to review an 
error made in its legal or factual analysis of a particular case.19  Essentially, 
“[a] motion to reconsider asks that a decision be reexamined in light of 
additional legal arguments . . . while a motion to reopen asks for 
reconsideration on the basis of facts or evidence not available at the time of 
the original decision.”20  Together, these two motions have been statutorily 
codified as part of our immigration adjudication and enforcement scheme, 
albeit with some limitations on use. 
3.  The Post-departure Bar Generally 
The post-departure bar consists of two regulations promulgated by the 
Attorney General.21  Those regulations bar motions to reopen or reconsider 
filed before either the IJ or the BIA where the individual has already 
departed from the United States.22  While these two regulations have 
engendered a large amount of litigation in recent years,23 the prospect of an 
alien’s motion to reopen or reconsider being barred post-departure has not 
always been so controversial, as the bar existed for years before the passage 
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA).24 
4.  1952–1990:  Beginnings of the Bar 
Regulations governing the agency’s lack of jurisdiction over post-
departure motions were first promulgated in 1952, following passage of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).25  Shortly after these 
regulations were passed, the BIA determined that they were a jurisdictional 
limitation, thus constitutionally depriving the BIA of power to hear such 
 
be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 5 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY 
MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, 
§ 64.03[4][b] (rev. ed. 2012) (citations omitted). 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
 19. See 1 GORDON, MAILMAN, YALE-LOEHR & WADA, supra note 17, § 3.05 [8][b]. 
 20. Patel v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 21. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1) (2011). 
 22. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) (applying to motions filed with the BIA), 1003.23(b)(1) 
(governing motions filed with an IJ).  
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); see also infra Part I.A.4–5. 
 25. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 173 (1952).  The INA authorized the Attorney 
General to promulgate regulations in order to properly administer and enforce the new 
legislation. See generally Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 655–58 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing 
the history of the post-departure bar and other related regulations). 
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motions.26  These regulations did not stay untouched for long.  In 1958, 
Congress revised them, granting the BIA sua sponte authority to reconsider 
or reopen decisions on its own determination for those who had departed.27  
Three years later, when Congress amended the INA to create a regime for 
judicial review of BIA decisions,28 the statute governing judicial review 
included a post-departure bar.29  This regulatory and statutory scheme 
prevailed for nearly thirty years. 
5.  1990:  The Winds of Change Begin to Blow 
The Immigration Act of 199030 ordered the Attorney General to impose 
some limitations on the use of motions to reopen and reconsider.  These 
included “a limitation on the number of such motions and a maximum time 
period for the filing of such motions.”31  This was a reversal from the prior 
regime, which was relatively free of procedural restrictions (beyond the 
post-departure bar itself).32 
The idea was that such limitations would help reduce excessive motion 
practice by aliens facing removal, who would file successive motions to 
delay their removal.33  On this theory, it seems that it would be especially 
disruptive to allow such motions when an alien had already departed the 
country.   
Ultimately, the Attorney General issued new regulations to act as a 
stopgap against this purported abuse.34  The new rule was that “[i]n most 
instances, the motion to reopen must be filed not later than 90 days after the 
date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.”35  
Additionally, an alien was limited to one motion to reconsider, filed up to 
thirty days after a final decision.36  These regulations were instituted despite 
 
 26. See In re G— y B—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 159–60 (B.I.A. 1954) (“We believe we are 
without jurisdiction to act on the motion . . . .  In law there exists no decision of this Board in 
this case.  It follows that we are without jurisdiction to entertain a motion to reconsider 
. . . .”). 
 27. See Miscellaneous Amendments to Chapter, 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9117–19 (Nov. 26, 
1958). 
 28. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (1961). 
 29. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (2006) (“An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not 
be reviewed by any court if the alien . . . has departed from the United States . . . .”) 
(repealed 1996). 
 30. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 656–57 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing how in 1990 
aliens were permitted to file an unlimited number of motions to reopen with no time 
limitations). 
 33. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (“[I]n a deportation proceeding . . . every 
delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the 
United States.”). 
 34. See Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration 
Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,901, 18,905 (Apr. 29, 1996). 
 35. Id. at 18,900. 
 36. See id. 
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doubts expressed by the Attorney General regarding their necessity.37 A 
prominent exception to these rules that allowed some flexibility when 
outside the outlined limits was the sua sponte authority of the IJ and the 
BIA to reopen a proceeding.38 
Shortly after the Attorney General promulgated the regulations enforcing 
the 1990 Amendments, Congress decided to codify many of them in a new 
piece of legislation.39  That codification is part of a broader series of 
immigration reforms within IIRIRA.40 
B.  Opening Up a Can of Worms:  IIRIRA 
IIRIRA was a comprehensive change to U.S. immigration law.41  At the 
time, there was a perceived problem of an ever-growing number of 
undocumented immigrants crossing into the United States and abusing the 
immigration system in order to stay in the country.42 
IIRIRA bolstered immigration law enforcement in several ways.  For 
example, IIRIRA’s provisions included vastly increasing the number of 
Border Patrol agents in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),43 
 
 37. See Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2315 (2008) (“The Attorney General found 
little evidence of abuse . . . .”).  The Attorney General viewed such restrictions as an 
effective disincentive against the use of motions in bad faith. Id. 
 38. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1) (2011); see also Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 
650, 657 (2d. Cir. 2010) (“Chief among these mechanisms were the regulations providing 
authority to both an IJ and the BIA to reopen, sua sponte . . . .”). 
 39. See infra Part I.B. 
 40. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-46, 3009-587 (1996). 
 41. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 42. See 142 CONG. REC. 5303 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde).  Representative Hyde 
stated: 
Today, undocumented aliens surreptitiously cross our border with impunity.  Still 
others enter as nonimmigrants with temporary legal status, but often stay on 
indefinitely and illegally.  The INS administrative and adjudicatory processes are a 
confusing, inefficient bureaucratic maze, resulting in crippling delays in 
decisionmaking.  The easy availability of fraudulent documents frustrates honest 
employers, who seek to prevent the employment of persons not authorized to work 
in the United States.  Unfortunately, the result of illicit job prospects only serves as 
a magnet to further illegal immigration.  Clearly, we face a multifaceted 
breakdown of immigration law enforcement that requires our urgent attention. 
Id.; see also David Johnston, Government Is Quickly Using Power of New Immigration Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A20.  The article notes: 
  The new law limiting immigrants’ access to the courts reflects a harsh reality:  
that the political furor in Congress and the Administration about illegal 
immigration and criminal aliens has found its way into law. 
  . . . . 
  Lawmakers who supported the bill said it was necessary to unclog an 
immigration system swamped with lawsuits by people without citizenship or 
residency rights who used the Federal courts to prolong their stays in the United 
States or even gain a foothold on American citizenship. 
Id. 
 43. See Pub. L. 104-208, div. C, §§ 101(a)–(b), 304, 110 Stat. 3009-553–54 (1996) 
(calling for the hiring of a minimum of 1,000 new agents every year for the next five years 
and a maximum of 300 new support personnel each year). 
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hiring more Assistant U.S. Attorneys to prosecute those who harbor or 
bring illegal aliens across borders,44 and increasing civil penalties on those 
who enter the country illegally.45 
More importantly for the purposes of this Note, IIRIRA also included 
several provisions that changed some of the opportunities for aliens to 
access the federal courts to defend against removal.46  Essentially, IIRIRA 
restricted judicial review of removal orders in some cases and limited the 
granting of relief from a removal order.47  For example, IIRIRA superseded 
the former codifications of the judicial review bars under prior amendments 
to the INA, such as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), passed just a few months earlier.48  By superseding this earlier 
bar, IIRIRA carried forward the rule that aliens subject to removal because 
of certain criminal convictions could find no relief in the courts after their 
BIA proceedings were complete.49  Further, IIRIRA consolidated exclusion 
and deportation proceedings into one “removal” proceeding and 
simultaneously implemented a single scheme of judicial review, replacing 
the dual system that had existed earlier.50 
Interestingly, IIRIRA replaced the prior ban on post-departure judicial 
review of BIA rulings.51  As explained later, litigants in challenges of the 
post-departure bar have pointed to IIRIRA’s repeal of the bar on post-
departure judicial review as evidence that Congress also intended to abolish 
post-departure administrative review, albeit with limited success.52 
Further, the statute adopted several new limitations on the filing of 
motions to reopen and reconsider, unrelated to the regulatory post-departure 
bar.  Codifying several of the Attorney General’s regulations related to the 
1990 amendments, aliens who are ordered removed are now statutorily 
limited to one motion to reopen53 within ninety days of the final order.54  
Similarly, they are also limited to one motion to reconsider,55 which must 
 
 44. See id. § 204(a)–(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-567. 
 45. See id. § 105(d), 110 Stat. at 3009-556. 
 46. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 179 (“In . . . the 1996 Act, Congress 
streamlined and accelerated the removal of noncitizens with criminal records.”); see also 
infra notes 47–51, 53–59. 
 47. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 179. 
 48. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 423, 110 Stat. 1214, 1272 (repealed 1996); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and 
Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 
463–64 (2006). 
 49. Motomura, supra note 48, at 463–64. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 (1996); Zhang 
v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Under these revisions to the INA, an alien is 
no longer foreclosed from seeking judicial review of a BIA order after he or she departs 
from the country.”). 
 52. See infra notes 214, 219, 270 and accompanying text. 
 53. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2006). 
 54. See id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). 
 55. See id. § 1229a(c)(6)(A). 
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be filed within thirty days.56  Additionally, Congress codified several 
exceptions to these limitations that were derived from the prior regulations.  
These exceptions include motions to reopen that are based on an asylum 
request due to changed country conditions57 and, in a later amendment, 
motions to reopen filed by battered spouses, children, and parents.58  These 
new limitations reflect a further move away from the past, when there were 
no such restrictions on an alien’s right to file these motions.59 
While Congress adopted these regulations in IIRIRA, it did not adopt all 
of the 1990 regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.60  Most 
significantly for the purposes of this Note, IIRIRA makes no mention of 
either the regulatory post-departure bar or the BIA’s newly promulgated sua 
sponte authority.61  In totality, IIRIRA had actually restricted the rights of 
aliens in a greater fashion than had existed before, but in levying these 
restrictions, had not included a statutory regulatory post-departure bar.  In 
this void, the Attorney General quickly moved to promulgate new 
regulations the following year to reestablish these rules.62 
These most recent regulations “reinstated” the post-departure bar and the 
BIA’s sua sponte authority.63  Of course, there is the question whether these 
regulations were actually “reinstated” at all, or if they had simply always 
been present.  Thus, IIRIRA’s silence on these matters could be just that:  
silence.  The Attorney General’s office espoused this belief in promulgating 
the new regulations.64  Under this view, the post-departure bar remained 
intact after the passage of IIRIRA. 
Later in 2000, Congress tried to make it easier for some alien victims of 
domestic violence to move to reopen their cases by passing the Violence 
Against Women Act of 2000.65  Then, in 2005, Congress added the caveat 
that the aliens filing these domestic-violence-based motions to reopen could 
 
 56. See id. § 1229a(c)(6)(B). 
 57. See id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 
 58. See id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv); see infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 59. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 646, 654 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[T]he Board has always had the regulatory power to entertain 
motions, but for the first half-century of our existence, there was no statute delineating the 
scope or limits of that power.”). 
 60. Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Approximately three months 
later, Congress codified some—but not all—of the Attorney General’s 1996 regulations 
regarding motions to reopen.”). 
 61. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 (1996); 
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657; Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 654. 
 62. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; 
Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (Mar. 6, 1997). 
 63. See id. at 10,330–31. 
 64. Id. at 10,321 (“No provision of the new section 242 of the Act supports reversing the 
long established rule that a motion to reopen or reconsider cannot be made in immigration 
proceedings by or on behalf of a person after that person’s departure from the United 
States.”). 
 65. See Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. B, § 1506(c), 114 Stat. 1464, 1528 (2000) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv) (2006)). 
 1060 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
not bring them after departing from the United States.66  This stands as the 
most recent congressional word on the post-departure bar. 
The circuit courts have differed on the issue of whether the post-
departure bar is still valid following IIRIRA’s omission of a bar and the 
subsequent regulations attempting to bring the bar back into existence.67  
Some courts have found that the statutory silence clearly indicates 
congressional intent to eliminate the bar, while others have found the 
statutory silence to be ambiguous, so that the Attorney General’s 
regulations must stand, as they have been found to be reasonable.68  Still 
other courts have applied the holding of Union Pacific to find that an 
agency cannot limit its own jurisdiction, and thus the BIA and IJ must hear 
post-departure motions.69   
In order to understand this conflict, one must first get a sense for how 
removal proceedings work within the larger framework of immigration law.  
The following section will discuss the general procedural background for 
removal proceedings, and the authorities involved. 
C.  Removal Proceedings in General 
Before delving into the complex details of the conflict over the post-
departure bar, it is important to explain the modern state of the U.S. 
immigration enforcement framework and the different types of situations 
that could lead to removal.  This is important because reviewing courts have 
been faced with a variety of different factual scenarios when grappling with 
this issue.70 
The executive’s removal power is divided among several different 
government agencies.  After the September 11 attacks, the INS was 
abolished, and its functions were mainly moved into the new Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) under the guise of three separate agencies:  
(1) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), (2) U.S. 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and (3) U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP).71  The USCIS oversees the issuance of 
immigrations benefits, such as work permits and adjustments of status, such 
 
 66. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 825(a)(2)(F), 119 Stat. 2960, 3063–64 (2006) (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006)). 
 67. See infra Part II. 
 68. See infra Part II.B–C, E–F. 
 69. See infra Part II.B, D. 
 70. See infra Part II. 
 71. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 291 (2006)); Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 91 n.1 (2d 
Cir. 2007); MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 9–10 
(3d ed. 2008). Also, the Department of Justice (DOJ) takes some role in handling the INS’ 
old functions.  For example, DOJ supervises the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR).  See infra note 75. 
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as permanent residence and naturalization.72  ICE handles enforcement of 
the laws and performs duties such as executing removal orders, 
investigating violations, and detaining violators while their removal 
proceedings take place.73  Finally, the CBP handles security both along the 
borders and at transportation facilities that serve as points of entry from 
overseas.74 
When a resident alien or illegal immigrant runs afoul of these agencies, 
he or she is referred to the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR), which runs the U.S. immigration courts, and is under the 
supervision of the Department of Justice.75  ICE employs the attorneys who 
litigate before the EOIR on behalf of the government.76  Referral is made 
by the issuance of a Notice to Appear before a IJ.77  Notices to Appear can 
be issued for a violation of immigration law, including being convicted of a 
nonimmigration crime while on American soil, or for overstaying a visa.78  
Once a Notice to Appear has been served, the alien must report to the one of 
fifty-nine immigration courts79 his or her case has been assigned to at the 
 
 72. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 10; What We Do, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ (follow “ABOUT US” hyperlink; then 
follow “What We Do” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 73. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 10–11; ICE Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 74. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 10–11; CBP Mission Statement and Core Values, 
U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/
mission/guardians.xml; See Immigration Inspection Program, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/port_activities/overview.xml (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
 75. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 12–14; Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST., www.justice.gov/eoir (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  “In a removal 
proceeding the opposing parties are the noncitizen and ICE.  The immigration judges . . . are 
today formally independent of the immigration agencies.  They are part of the Justice 
Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review.” STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & 
CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 504 (5th ed. 2009) 
(citations omitted). 
 76. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 10.  “In every case in which removability is 
contested, and in certain other situations, ICE must be represented by a lawyer known as a 
‘trial attorney.’” LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 75, at 654 (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1240.2(b), 1240.10(d) (2008)).  These “trial attorneys” are employed in ICE’s Office of 
the Principal Legal Advisor. See id. 
 77. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 14–15, 51–53; DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA 
DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL, 269–71 (5th ed. 2005).  
Notices to appear commonly include the allegations against the immigrant, including the 
particular statute alleged to be violated, and name an immigration court, date, and time 
where the alien can appear to contest the charges.  Further, they include a list of rights that 
the respondent alien has in relation to the proceeding. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 51–53; 
see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 75, at 504 (describing Notices to Appear). 
 78. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 77, at 235–42; RELIEF FROM REMOVAL:  
A DEFINITIVE MANUAL FOR WINNING CASES 45–47 (Jill Sheldon ed., 2007–2008). 
 79. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last updated Apr. 2011).  These courts are commonly located in major 
cities such as New York, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, and Miami.  They can also be 
found in smaller cities in states that may have significant immigrant populations.  For 
example, there is a court in the small city of Harlingen, Texas.  While there is not an 
immigration court in every state, there is a wide geographic distribution, covering each 
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date and time provided.80  There, he or she will appear before one of the 
over 260 IJs on the bench.81  The government carries the burden of proof in 
removal cases before the IJ; therefore, it must show the IJ that there is 
“clear and convincing evidence” that the alien is deportable before the IJ 
can rule in the government’s favor.82 
If the government successfully proves its case, the alien will face 
removal.83  The alien can then file a notice of appeal with the BIA within 
thirty days of the decision.84  This filing acts as an automatic stay of the 
removal order, meaning that the alien cannot be removed before the BIA 
takes the case.85  If the alien voluntarily departs the United States while the 
appeal is pending, the IJ’s order is then considered final and effective.86  
Additionally, a stay is not automatic when the alien files for a review of the 
agency’s final decision in the federal circuit court.87 
D.  The Post-departure Bar in Action 
This subsection focuses on four common grounds that a motion to reopen 
can be based on, as well as examples of when a motion to reconsider can be 
filed.  These examples illustrate factual situations that are typical in the case 
law.  If the BIA upholds the IJ’s decision, the alien now only has a limited 
set of options with which to prevent final removal.  One option would be to 
file a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider and then appeal to a circuit 
court if the motion is denied and “constitutional claims or questions of law” 
are implicated.88 
Before examining the intricacies of the motions to reopen and reconsider, 
this Note will briefly discuss the details of the judicial review portion of this 
remedy. A petition for judicial review with the circuit court must be filed 
within thirty days of the BIA’s final decision.89  Such an appeal does not 
carry the automatic stay of removal that an appeal to the BIA from an IJ’s 
ruling does.90  Further, these appeals are now limited to “constitutional 
 
region of the United States. See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last updated Sept. 2012). 
 80. See supra note 77. 
 81. See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last updated Apr. 2011).   
 82. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8 (2011). 
 83. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 17.  
 84. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3; see also WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 77, at 309–
11. 
 85. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a) (“[T]he decision in any proceeding under this chapter from 
which an appeal to the Board may be taken shall not be executed during the time allowed for 
the filing of an appeal . . . .”). 
 86. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e).  Essentially, this means that once the alien departs the United 
States prior to filing an appeal, the right to file an appeal is waived. 
 87. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 88. See infra note 91. 
 89. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2006). 
 90. See id. § 1252(b)(3)(B)  (“Service of the petition on the officer or employee does not 
stay the removal of an alien pending the court’s decision on the petition, unless the court 
orders otherwise.”); KRAMER, supra note 71, at 21 (“Note that unlike an appeal to the BIA, a 
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claims or questions of law”91 and do not review the factual determinations 
of the EOIR.92 
Before judicial review can be implicated to reopen or reconsider a case, 
and potentially lead to a reversed removal order, a motion must be filed.  
Motions to reopen are the more common of the two, and usually arise in 
four different ways:  “changed country conditions with regard to asylum 
claims; allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel; new eligibility for 
relief from removal; and vacatur of a conviction that formed the basis for 
the order of removal.”93 
Within asylum claims, “changed country conditions” refers to the 
situation that occurs when conditions in the alien’s country of origin have 
changed so that the alien now has a well-founded fear of persecution upon 
their return, and thus, she now seeks asylum.94  These motions are 
sometimes not subject to the same restrictions as other motions to reopen.95   
There is a two-step process for the granting of asylum:  first, the applicant 
must prove he or she is a refugee,96 and second, he or she must prove that 
they merit a favorable exercise of discretion by the IJ.97  If the initial 
asylum application is denied, but the conditions back home change so that 
the alien is now in danger of persecution, a motion to reopen the case can be 
granted and asylum ultimately accepted.98 
 
petition for review to the federal court of appeals carries no automatic stay of removal.  The 
non-American citizen must move for a stay of the removal order.”). 
 91. The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23, 
changed the jurisdictional scheme by limiting jurisdiction to hear these habeas corpus 
appeals to the circuit courts. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Further, such review was sharply 
limited, including to “constitutional claims or questions of law.” See id.   However, 
“questions of law” can be considered somewhat ambiguous.  For example, Ramadan v. 
Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 650–54 (9th Cir. 2007), held that the merits of a “changed 
circumstances” claim could be heard under this standard, even though it was a mixed 
question of law and fact, because it involved the review of the application of law to 
undisputed facts. 
 92. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (stating that with limited exception, the findings of fact 
from the administrative hearings are conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary”). 
 93. POST-DEPORTATION HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & 
INT’L JUSTICE AT BOS. COLL., POST-DEPARTURE MOTIONS TO REOPEN OR RECONSIDER 2 
(2012), available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights/pdf/MTR%20
Advisory%202012%20FINAL.pdf. 
 94. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006); 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2011); see RELIEF FROM REMOVAL, supra note 78, at 374, 378–80. 
 95. EOIR IJ Benchbook Motion to Reopen Guide, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, available at 
www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/Motions to Reopen Guide.htm (last visited Oct. 
20, 2012). 
 96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (defining “refugee”); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) 
(2011) (explaining that refugee status can be established by showing either past persecution 
or a well-founded fear of future persecution). 
 97. See Ndrecaj v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 667, 674 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing this two-part 
test). 
 98. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 566 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding for BIA to reopen 
the case after alien made prima facie case for asylum eligibility based on fear of being 
persecuted under Chinese family planning laws). 
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Second, mistakes made by counsel can be the source of a reopening in 
cases where aliens can satisfy the standard for ineffectiveness.99  The 
requirements for granting a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel are outlined in In re Lozada.100  Some circuits recognize this as 
precedent,101 while others do not recognize this doctrine in relation to 
removal proceedings altogether.102 If an alien can successfully meet these 
requirements, the motion to reopen will be granted, and the appeal will 
again proceed before the BIA.103 
Third, claims of new eligibility for relief from removal include situations 
where new circumstances make the alien eligible for discretionary relief.  
Some examples where this would be possible include when an alien files 
for cancellation of removal by meeting certain requirements104 or for 
voluntary departure.105  These motions will not be granted if the alien’s 
rights to make such an application were explained to them at the initial 
proceeding before the IJ, and they were afforded an opportunity to apply for 
such relief but failed to do so.106  However, they may be allowed if 
subsequent circumstances have arisen.107 
 
 99. See Lopez-Vega v. Holder, 336 F. App’x. 622, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2009) (alien’s 
counsel missed the deadline to file an appeal to the BIA and incorrectly filled out the 
necessary certificate of service); Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (alien’s 
counsel missed the deadline to file an appeal to BIA by several days, causing BIA to dismiss 
original appeal as untimely). 
 100. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988). 
 101. See Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 409 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2005); Hernandez v. 
Reno, 238 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 102. See Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 859–61 (8th Cir. 2008); Magala v. Gonzales, 
434 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 103. See Lopez-Vega, 336 F.App’x. at 624. 
 104. See 5 GORDON, MAILMAN, YALE-LOEHR & WADA, supra note 17, § 64.04[3][a]–[b].  
The Attorney General can decide to cancel removal of an alien who has “accrued ten years 
of continuous physical presence,” has been a person of “good moral character,” has not been 
convicted of certain criminal offenses, and who “establishes that removal would result in 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his or her U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, parent, 
or child.” Id. § 64.04[3][b] (citations omitted); see also EOIR IJ Benchbook Motion to 
Reopen Guide, supra note 95. 
 105. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 340 (“[A] benefit whereby the individual avoids an 
order of removal and is allowed to leave . . . generally of his or her own accord . . . .  
Theoretically, an individual who departs . . . pursuant to a grant of voluntary departure 
leaves with a ‘clean record,’ and is free to return . . . with proper admission documents.”).   
Voluntary departure is available “(1) before the conclusion of removal proceedings; and 
(2) at the conclusion of removal proceedings.” 5 GORDON, MAILMAN, YALE-LOEHR & 
WADA, supra note 17, § 64.05[1].  There are more requirements for finding voluntary 
departure after proceedings have concluded, where the IJ can only allow for voluntary 
departure if the alien has been physically present for at least a year preceding service of a 
Notice to Appear, the applicant has been a person of “good moral character” for at least five 
years prior to the application, the applicant is not deportable for conviction under an 
aggravated felony or for participating in terrorist activities, “the alien has established by 
clear and convincing evidence that the alien has the means to depart the United States and 
intends to do so,” the alien posts bond to ensure departure and the alien was not previously 
permitted to voluntarily depart after being found inadmissible. See id. § 64.05[3] (citations 
omitted). 
 106. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2011). 
 107. See EOIR IJ Benchbook Motion to Reopen Guide, supra note 95. 
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The fourth common category concerns the vacatur of a criminal 
conviction that was the basis for the original removal order.  For the first 
time in the history of the INA, Congress included a definition of 
“conviction” in IIRIRA, as a way to clarify when an alien is eligible for 
removal in a variety of situations, including after pleading guilty.108  
However, the fact remains that underlying criminal convictions can be 
vacated, potentially allowing for reopening.109 
For example, it is possible to be “convicted” and removed even if a state 
court judge does not formally declare guilt.110  However, if an alien can 
successfully vacate his conviction, it still may not be enough to grant a 
reopening of the case.  While, “[a]s a general rule, [the BIA gives] full faith 
and credit to State court actions that purport to vacate an alien’s criminal 
conviction[,]”111 if the conviction is based solely on “immigration hardships 
or rehabilitation, rather than on the basis of a substantive or procedural 
defect in the underlying criminal proceedings,”112 then the conviction is 
still valid for the purposes of removal.113  However, if this is not the case, 
then the alien may be able to have the case reopened and the removal order 
reversed.114 
Finally, motions for reconsideration can also be used to try to reverse an 
adverse removal order.  These motions are wholly separate from motions to 
reopen.115  A motion to reconsider should include: 
(1) an allegation of material factual or legal errors in the Board’s decision 
that is supported by pertinent authority; (2) if the Board summarily 
affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, a showing that the alleged 
errors and legal arguments were previously raised on appeal and a 
statement explaining how the Board erred in affirming the Immigration 
Judge’s decision under the [affirmance without opinion] regulations; and 
(3) if there has been a change in law, a reference to the relevant statute, 
regulation, or precedent and an explanation of how the outcome of the 
Board’s decision is materially affected by the change.116 
 
 108. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2006); Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 328, 331–33 (2d. Cir. 2007) (describing legislative history of this 
provision of IIRIRA). 
 109. See infra notes 211, 229, 265. 
 110. See Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 735 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding “conviction” 
where alien had pled guilty to a low-level sexual conduct charge and been sentenced to 
probation and fines, with an explicit statement by the court that there was no judgment of 
conviction). 
 111. See In re Chavez-Martinez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 272, 273 (B.I.A. 2007). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See infra notes 222–40 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra Part I.A.1–2. 
 116. In re O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 60 (B.I.A. 2006); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) 
(2011) (regulating motions to reconsider filed with the BIA). 
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For example, these motions can be filed in situations where the BIA did not 
consider an argument as to why a particular statute was inapplicable to the 
alien’s case.117 
In these five situations, aliens attempt to reverse an adverse removal 
order against them.  Unfortunately, if they have already left the country 
when the motion is filed, they may come up against the post-departure bar, 
which theoretically deprives the BIA or IJ of jurisdiction to hear their 
motion.  The next section generally discusses the different approaches that 
courts have taken in assessing the post-departure bar. 
E.  Tools for Dismantling or Upholding the Bar:  
Chevron and Union Pacific 
In recent years, courts approaching the question of whether the post-
departure bar is still valid following IIRIRA have mainly relied on analysis 
derived from two cases.  The first primary tool to be deployed against the 
post-departure bar is the Chevron doctrine.  In this case, the Supreme Court 
laid out a two-step framework for determining whether an executive agency 
interpretation of a possibly ambiguous congressionally enacted statute 
should be given judicial deference.118  Chevron concerned the definition of 
“stationary source” in the amended Clean Air Act.119  The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) interpreted the statutory language to allow an 
entire plant to constitute a single source, making it easier for factory owners 
who wanted to build new pollution-emitting devices to gain state approval 
as long as the total emissions from the plant did not exceed the statutory 
threshold.120  The Court applied a new framework to determine whether an 
agency should receive deference for their interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute.  Ultimately, the Court found that the EPA’s interpretation was 
permissible.121 
The Chevron analysis proceeds as follows.  First, under step one, the 
court must determine whether the statute is truly ambiguous, using tools of 
statutory interpretation122:  “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”123  However, if the statute is 
ambiguous, the court must determine whether the agency’s gap-filling was 
reasonable, meaning not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
 
 117. See Mu Ju Li v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 575, 576–77 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 118. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 119. Id. at 840. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 866. 
 122. See id. at 842–43. 
 123. Id. 
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statute.”124  The Chevron analysis has been performed many times, in many 
different areas of law.125 
Commentators have different views regarding Chevron’s purpose and 
function,126 but it appears that the basic point of the doctrine is to effectuate 
congressional intent.127  But in the context of the post-departure bar, 
capturing congressional intent is no simple task.128  The answer, under step 
one of the Chevron analysis, has led some courts to lift the bar.129 
The main alternative ground for attacking the bar is the Court’s decision 
in Union Pacific.  In this case, the Court was faced with the question of 
whether it was appropriate for the National Railroad Adjustment Board 
(NRAB) to decline hearing the disciplinary arbitration claims of five 
railroad employees for lack of jurisdiction.130  Essentially, the NRAB had 
taken a procedural issue and elevated it into a jurisdictional one.131 
The Court distinguished a conferencing requirement as a claim-
processing, administrative requirement, instead of a jurisdictional 
requirement.132  Therefore, the NRAB could not waive its own subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear the cases.133 
The decision in Union Pacific has followed a recent trend in which the 
Supreme Court has sought to separate jurisdictional rules from 
nonjurisdictional rules.  Cases in which seemingly minor rules have been 
considered jurisdictional are known as “drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”134  
 
 124. Id. at 843–44. 
 125. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189–90 (2006) 
(“Chevron has had a fundamental impact on areas as disparate as taxation, labor law, 
environmental protection, immigration, food and drug regulation, and highway safety.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 126. See Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (2007) 
(describing the two camps that have emerged, and that some scholars think both motivations 
are at work).  “The scholarship has settled into two roughly defined camps.  One camp 
argues that Chevron is a separation of powers decision . . . to abide by and police 
congressional intent.  The other camp believes that Chevron deference is driven by the 
greater competence and experience that agencies have relative to courts in interpreting the 
statutes . . . .” Id.; see Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2071, 2077 (1990) (“[Chevron] embodies, in those applications, a plausible 
reconstruction of congressional desires and a sound understanding of the comparative 
advantages of agencies in administering complex statutes.”). 
 127. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 2109–10. 
 128. See infra Part II.B, E. 
 129. See infra notes 222–40, 333–50, and Part II.F. 
 130. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 594 (2009) 
(denying jurisdiction because there was not enough proof that mandated conferencing had 
taken place at the internal level, even though the objection raised by the industry panel 
member was possibly untimely). 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. at 597 (finding that the conferencing requirement was listed as a general duty in 
the statute, and not as part of the “‘[e]stablishment[,] . . . powers[,] and duties’ of the 
NRAB”). 
 133. See id. at 596–99. 
 134. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (“We have described such 
unrefined dispositions as ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings’ that should be accorded ‘no 
precedential effect’ on the question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate the 
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In these cases, it is common for the issue to be obscured when a case is 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because it is unclear whether the 
dismissal should really be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for 
failure to state a claim.135  In a string of decisions, the Court has struck 
down rulings that declined jurisdiction as the result of some failed 
precondition.136  This shift in the Court’s thinking was intended to cut back 
on overuse of the word “jurisdiction”137 by delineating the line between 
rules that are truly “jurisdictional” and those that are not.138  Therefore, 
only rules that explicitly grant courts the authority to hear a case will be 
found to be truly “jurisdictional.”139  This means that the absence of some 
fact alone might not be enough to deprive the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.140 
Together, Chevron and Union Pacific have both served as potential 
answers to the question of the post-departure bar’s present validity for 
different circuits examining the issue. 
F.  Immigration Law in the Past Decade 
In recent years, three norms have emerged that the Supreme Court has 
relied on in favor of immigrants:  (1) the presumption that administrative 
actions should be subject to judicial review, even in the immigration 
context; (2) the use of a “clear statement rule” to prevent congressional 
silence from being transformed into a nonexistent legislative mandate; and 
(3) that immigrants should have every opportunity to fight the harsh 
consequences of removal.141 
An important case that outlines these three principles is INS v. St. Cyr.142  
Enrico St. Cyr was admitted into the United States from Haiti in 1986 and 
 
claim in suit.” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91(1998))); 
Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 947, 948 (2011). 
 135. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511. 
 136. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011) (defining 
a 120-day time limit for filing an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
from the Board of Veteran Appeals as nonjurisdictional); Union Pacific, 130 S. Ct. at 594; 
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1245–47  (2010) (finding a registration 
requirement of the Copyright Act nonjurisdictional for the purposes of a district court having 
authority to approve a plaintiff class and settlement). 
 137. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510–11 (2006) (“This Court . . . has sometimes been 
profligate in its use of the term.”). 
 138. See Wasserman, supra note 134, at 955. 
 139. See id.  This does not mean that the plaintiff cannot be defeated on the substantive 
claim, but that the claim at least has to be heard if jurisdiction exists. See id. at 949. 
“However merits are defined, the question of who should win under substantive law remains 
distinct from the court’s adjudicative authority.” Id. at 950. 
 140. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511  (“Judicial opinions, the Second Circuit incisively 
observed, ‘often obscure the issue by stating that the court is dismissing for lack of 
jurisdiction when some threshold fact has not been established . . . .’” (quoting Da Silva v. 
Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 141. See infra notes 142–77 and accompanying text. 
 142. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
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pled guilty to selling a controlled substance a decade later.143  Before the 
passage of AEDPA, St. Cyr would have been eligible for discretionary 
relief from removal.144  However, because St. Cyr’s removal proceedings 
did not begin until after both AEDPA and IIRIRA were enacted, he was 
considered ineligible for that relief.145  St. Cyr subsequently filed a petition 
for habeas corpus, claiming that the new restrictions did not apply 
retroactively.146  In 2001, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling that 
jurisdiction existed to hear the petition.147 
The jurisdictional analysis by the Court included two of the foregoing 
principles:  the clear statement rule and the judicial review presumption.148  
The Court stated that if Congress intended to repeal something as 
fundamental as habeas corpus rights, the Court would require proof that 
Congress clearly stated that intention.149  Thus, the Court reviewed four 
different statutes that were part of AEDPA and IIRIRA and found that none 
of those statutes clearly stated that they were stripping habeas corpus 
jurisdiction.150  Further, the Court cited the first norm in support of this 
ruling.151  Thus, jurisdiction to hear St. Cyr’s petition was proper.152  This 
ruling also indirectly serves the third principle, by enabling St. Cyr to have 
a further opportunity to attempt to fight his removal.153 
 
 143. Id. at 293. 
 144. See id. (noting that this is the law that would have applied at the time of St. Cyr’s 
conviction). 
 145. Id. (“[R]emoval proceedings against him were not commenced until April 10, 1997, 
after both AEDPA and IIRIRA became effective, and, as the Attorney General interprets 
those statutes, he no longer has discretion to grant such a waiver.”). 
 146. Id.  The district court exercised jurisdiction over St. Cyr’s petition and agreed, with 
the Second Circuit affirming. Id.  
 147. See id. at 298–314 (finding that the four statutory provisions in question from 
AEDPA and IIRIRA could not be found to have repealed habeas corpus jurisdiction for these 
cases involving “pure questions of law”).  Additionally, the Court went on to find that the 
provisions could not apply retroactively. See id. at 314–26. 
 148. Id. at 298 (“For the INS to prevail it must overcome both the strong presumption in 
favor of judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear 
statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”). 
 149. Before reaching this question, the Court analyzed the pre-1996 statutory scheme 
regarding habeas corpus jurisdiction to find that both “pure questions of law” could be raised 
before a judge under the Suspension Clause, and that such a practice was common in 
immigration law. See id. at 301–08. 
 150. The four statutes at issue were the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
§ 401(e), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and three provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), § 1252(a)(2)(c), and 
§ 1252(b)(9) (Supp. V 1999).  Applying principles of statutory construction, the Court found 
a clear statement of repeal lacking. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308–14. 
 151. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298 n.9 (citing the “strong presumption in favor of judicial 
review of administrative action” and supporting precedent). 
 152. Id. at 314. 
 153. Following this ruling, a confusing framework for habeas corpus jurisdiction 
remained.  Interestingly, those who fell under the ruling in St. Cyr (i.e., those who were 
ineligible for discretionary relief as the result of being convicted of an aggravated felony) 
were left with two judicial layers of review:  a habeas petition in the district courts, followed 
by an appeal at the circuit level.  This is in contrast to those who were still eligible for 
discretionary relief, because they could only file a petition for judicial review at the circuit 
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These principles have appeared repeatedly in several immigration cases 
over the past eleven years.  For example, in another case from 2001, these 
norms came to the forefront of a decision to place limits on indefinite 
detention for aliens facing a removal order.  That case, Zadvydas v. 
Davis,154 involved a challenge to the potentially indefinite detention of an 
alien arrested for intent to distribute cocaine, who was subsequently 
punished with a removal order.155  No other country would take him,156 and 
he was held for years in American detention under the authority of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(6).157 
The Supreme Court did not accept the argument that the statute allowed 
for indefinite detention, and instead interpreted it so as to avoid a violation 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by reading a 
“reasonableness” requirement into the statute.158  The Court’s analysis is 
partly based on two of the norms described above:  the clear statement rule 
and the judicial review presumption. 
The Court refused to find grounds for such an extraordinary result as 
potentially indefinite detention without a clear statement of congressional 
intent.159  Further, while the Court makes note of the strong “plenary 
power” of Congress in immigration, that power is not absolute, and the 
Court retains a role in striking down laws that violate the Constitution.160 
Nine years later, the Court heavily relied on these norms again in a case 
involving IIRIRA.  In Kucana v. Holder,161 an alien who attempted to file 
several motions to reopen a denial of asylum was denied review by the 
Seventh Circuit because of a perceived lack of jurisdiction to review 
 
level, and thus receive only one possible level of judicial scrutiny. See id. at 334–35 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); Gerald Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 
2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 139 (2006) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 174 (2005) 
(Conf. Rep.)).  This schism was solved by certain provisions of the REAL ID Act, which 
eliminated the habeas jurisdiction of the district courts for removal orders. See Neuman, 
supra note 153, at 136–42 (describing in detail how the REAL ID Act is structured to 
implement this change). 
 154. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 155. Id. at 684. 
 156. Id. at 684–85.  Germany refused to take Zadvydas because under German citizenship 
guidelines, he was not a German citizen, despite being born in a displaced persons camp in 
Germany in 1948. Id. at 684.  Further, the Dominican Republic also refused the INS’s 
request to admit him even though he had a Dominican-born wife. Id.  Finally, Lithuania 
refused to take him because he could not prove documentation of Lithuanian citizenship 
after he had immigrated to the United States with his Lithuanian-born parents in 1948. Id. 
 157. Under this statute, the government “may” continue to detain an alien after the ninety-
day removal period if they have not yet been deported, or the alien could be granted 
supervised release.  Further, regulations allow for a panel to decide whether to grant release 
within three months following the expiration of the ninety-day period or shortly after, by 
weighing factors such as the alien’s criminal history, mental health, and family ties. 8 C.F.R 
§ 241.4(f) (2011).  If deciding against release, the panel must review their decision again 
within a year, or sooner. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(k)(2)(iii), (v) (2011). 
 158. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–99. 
 159. Id. at 697–99 (“We have found nothing in the history of these statutes that clearly 
demonstrates a congressional intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention.”). 
 160. See id. at 695. 
 161. 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010). 
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motions to reopen based on discretionary decisions.162  The Seventh Circuit 
based this decision on the provision of IIRIRA that purportedly exempts 
discretionary decisions of the Attorney General from judicial review.163  
Because the Attorney General grants the BIA discretionary authority to hear 
a motion to reopen by regulation, the Seventh Circuit interpreted this statute 
to apply to regulatory discretion as well as statutory discretion.164 
The Supreme Court reversed this interpretation, focusing not only on the 
statutory language, which was silent, but also on the statute as a whole.165  
Further, the Court relied upon all three of the above-mentioned immigration 
law norms to reach its decision. 
First, the Court noted the importance of judicial oversight to protect the 
right to a motion to reopen, as it is an “‘important [procedural] safeguard’ 
designed ‘to ensure a proper and lawful disposition’ of immigration 
proceedings.”166  This is similar to the third norm, ensuring a fair shake for 
immigrants facing removal.  Next, the Court referred to the first norm, 
stating that statutory ambiguity favors judicial review of administrative 
action.167  The Court assumed that Congress would be aware of that 
presumption.168  Due to this assumption, the clear statement rule is 
implicated because it would then take “‘clear and convincing evidence’ to 
dislodge the presumption . . . .  There is no such evidence here.”169  Thus, 
all three of the above norms are involved in the Court’s decision favoring 
Kucana’s less harsh interpretation of the statute. 
These norms appear in other recent immigration cases, as well.  For 
example, in Nken v. Holder,170 the Court resolved a disagreement over 
whether the traditional test for granting a stay of a removal order or 
IIRIRA’s more stringent test used for injunctions should apply.171  The 
 
 162. See id. at 832–33.  Kucana filed a motion to reopen in 2006, attempting asylum relief 
by claiming changed country conditions in his native Albania, but the BIA denied it because 
conditions had improved there since Kucana’s original asylum hearing.  He then filed a 
petition for review in the Seventh Circuit, claiming an abuse of discretion. Id. 
 163. See id. at 833; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 164. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 833. 
 165. Id. at 835–40.  The government’s case was predicated on the word “under” in the 
statute meaning that because the BIA’s authority was pursuant to the Attorney General, it 
fell “under” this exception. Id. at 835–36.  However, the Court noted how the provisions 
sandwiching this word only referred to statutory discretion. Id. at 836–37.  Also, the Court 
noted how the exempted decisions were substantive ones made by the Attorney General, 
whereas the decision to deny a motion to reopen was related to procedure. Id. at 837–38. 
 166. Id. at 839 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–19 (2008)). 
 167. See id. at 839 (“Any lingering doubt about the proper interpretation . . . would be 
dispelled by a familiar principle of statutory construction:  the presumption favoring judicial 
review of administrative action.”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  For further analysis on Kucana and the related circuit split regarding judicial 
review over the denial of sua sponte motions to reopen by the BIA, see generally Michael A. 
Keough, Kucana v. Holder and Judicial Review of the Decision Not to Reopen Sua Sponte in 
Immigration Removal Proceedings, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075 (2011). 
 170. 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009). 
 171. See id. at 1756.  The statute in question is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (2006). 
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien 
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Court relied upon the clear statement rule in finding that IIRIRA did 
nothing to change the traditional test for a stay.172  Also, the Court 
disapproved the harsher standard, partly because it made no allowance for 
considering the irreparable harm done to the petitioner.173  This may 
indirectly serve the third norm, but the Court later seemed to back away 
from this principle by refusing to state that removal is so irreparable that it 
should lead to an automatic stay.174 
Additionally, in Dada v. Mukasey,175 the Court seemed to reference the 
clear statement rule in refusing to accept the idea that voluntary departure 
removes the right to file a motion to reopen.176  Finally, two recent 
decisions do not mention these norms directly, but both were resolved in 
favor of the immigrant, suggesting a possible trend in the Court’s rulings to 
favor the rights of aliens when removal is at risk.177  This backdrop sets the 
stage for the current conflict between circuits regarding the validity of the 
post-departure bar. 
II.  THE QUESTION OF THE POST-DEPARTURE BAR’S CURRENT VALIDITY 
It appears that the current state of the post-departure bar’s validity may 
be uncertain, as there is a definite trend towards repealing the bar in the 
majority of federal circuits.  The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have repealed the post-
departure bar in at least some situations, relying upon a number of different 
bases to reach their decisions.178  Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
weighed in on the issue in dicta, suggesting that the rule is untenable.179    
On the other side, the First Circuit has upheld the bar, and has not reversed 
course since.180 
 
pursuant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing 
evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.”). 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (citation omitted). 
 172. See Kucana, 129 S. Ct. at 1760 (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 316 
U.S. 4, 11 (1942)) (“[W]e are loath to conclude that Congress would, ‘without clearly 
expressing such a purpose, deprive the Court of Appeals of its customary power to stay 
orders under review.’”). 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. at 1761 (“Although removal is a serious burden for many aliens, it is not 
categorically irreparable, as some courts have said.”). 
 175. 128 S. Ct. 2307 (2008). 
 176. Id. at 2318 (“We must be reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute was 
designed to remove this important safeguard for the distinct class of deportable aliens most 
favored by the same law . . . .  This is particularly so when the plain text of the statute 
reveals no such limitation.”). 
 177. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485–87 (2010) (finding that an alien’s 
attorney’s failure to notify his client of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea was 
potentially deficient under the Sixth Amendment); Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 
1167–68 (2009) (ruling that the BIA’s interpretation of the “persecutor bar” was not entitled 
to Chevron deference because it was based on a legal error). 
 178. See infra Part II.A–B, D–E. 
 179. See infra notes 241–43. 
 180. See infra Part II.B–C.  The bar’s validity is still an open question in the Eighth and 
D.C. Circuits. 
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The analysis of this conflict proceeds in several chronological steps.  
First, Part II.A–B introduces the question of the bar’s validity with the 
Ninth Circuit’s unconventional ruling in Lin v. Gonzales,181 followed by the 
subsequent rulings in Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales182 and William v. 
Gonzales,183 which were the first to bring Chevron analysis into the picture, 
albeit with different results. 
Part II.C will discuss the pushback on the initial rulings in Lin and 
William, first discussing the BIA’s response to the attack on their lack of 
jurisdiction to hear these cases in In re Armendarez-Mendez,184 followed by 
the Tenth Circuit in Rosillo-Puga v. Holder.185 This section also details 
how the Fifth Circuit indirectly upheld the bar by failing to reach the 
question in Ovalles v. Holder.186 
Part II.D examines the emergence of Union Pacific in 2009 as a new, 
powerful tool in dismantling the bar, which the Seventh Circuit and Sixth 
Circuit took advantage of in Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder187 and Pruidze v. 
Holder,188 respectively.  Additionally, the Second Circuit’s initial reluctant 
upholding of the bar in Zhang v. Holder189, and then subsequent repeal of 
the bar in some situations in Luna v. Holder190 is noted. 
Finally, in Part II.E–F, the most recent rulings on the issue, including 
Prestol Espinal v. Attorney General,191 Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder,192 
and Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Attorney General193 are discussed.  These cases 
mark a return back to Chevron analysis as a way to undo the bar, possibly 
indicating a future trend in how other circuits may attack the bar.  Thus, this 
section reveals the chronological history of the post-departure bar, leading 
to its current position on its deathbed. 
A.  Opening Salvos:  Lin Opens the Door 
The year 2007 marked the beginning of the end194 for the stability of the 
post-departure bar, as change began to occur with three circuit court 
 
 181. 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 182. 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 183. 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 184. 24 I. & N. Dec. 646 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 185. 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 186. 577 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 187. 612 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 188. 632 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 189. 617 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 190. 637 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 191. 653 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 192. 678 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 193. 681 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 194. There was a somewhat relevant post-departure bar case decided in 2006.  In 
Contreras-Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General, 462 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh 
Circuit did not directly address the question of the departure bar’s validity; rather the court 
stated that if petitioner had not received adequate notice of the proceeding, the BIA and IJ 
retain jurisdiction to reopen at any time to consider whether notice was received, even post-
departure. See id. at 1317. 
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decisions.  In 2007, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the BIA could not decline 
jurisdiction to reopen a denial of asylum post-departure because removal 
proceedings had concluded.195  Zi-Xing Lin, a Chinese national, attempted 
to enter the United States on a flight from Russia with a fraudulent Japanese 
passport.196  He was detained and placed in removal proceedings, where he 
attempted to secure asylum, which the IJ refused.197  Lin illegally returned 
to the United States and filed a new petition for asylum, which was again 
denied.198  However, he remained in the United States and filed a motion to 
reopen in 2004 based on changed circumstances.199  The IJ rejected the 
motion for lack of jurisdiction to reopen the case, and the BIA affirmed this 
decision.200 
While the decisions of the IJ and BIA were largely based on an 
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), which subjects aliens illegally re-
entering to their prior removal order, the government’s main argument in 
the circuit court was that the post-departure bar applied.201  This argument 
was somewhat unusual compared to later cases, because the motion in 
question was not filed outside of the United States.  Rather, the government 
was simply arguing that because Lin had previously departed subject to a 
removal order, he could no longer bring a motion to reopen, even after 
returning to the United States.202 
The Ninth Circuit did not accept this argument, issuing a new reading of 
the regulation instead.  The court stated, “The regulation is phrased in the 
present tense and so by its terms applies only to a person who departs the 
United States while he or she ‘is the subject of removal . . . proceedings.”203  
Since Lin’s removal proceedings were long over, the ambiguous language, 
which the court construed in his favor, suggested that the bar no longer 
applied to him.204  This reading has not picked up much support in later 
cases,205 but does seem to be one of the first cracks in the wall of the post-
departure bar. 
While Lin may have only scratched the armor of the post-departure bar, 
two subsequent cases threatened to do far more damage to its continued 
existence. 
 
 195. Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 196. See id. at 980. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. at 981. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. at 981–82; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011). 
 202. See Lin, 473 F.3d at 982. 
 203. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)). 
 204. See id.  Additionally, the court found that the motion was improperly denied because 
the DHS did not comply with the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. Id. at 982–83. 
 205. See Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009); Ovalles v. Holder, 577 
F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646 (B.I.A. 2008).  
Also, there is no significant case following Lin that relies on its reasoning as a ground to 
dismantle the bar.  Interestingly, in a later case, the Ninth Circuit uses a straightforward 
Chevron analysis to dismantle an aspect of the BIA post-departure bar. See infra note 304. 
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B.  Pena-Muriel and William:  Chevron Arrives on the Scene 
Also in 2007, the First Circuit upheld the post-departure bar through the 
use of Chevron analysis.206  Fredy Hugo Pena-Muriel was admitted to the 
United States from Bolivia in 1970, when he was less than two years old.207  
In 1997, he was convicted of domestic assault under Rhode Island law, 
receiving a one-year suspended sentence plus probation.208  Because he 
never attained citizenship, he was subsequently placed into removal 
proceedings following the conviction.209  The IJ ordered removal, and 
Pena-Muriel was removed to Bolivia without attempting to fight the 
order.210  In 2002, the conviction was vacated based on a brief affidavit 
filed by the victim “stating that Pena-Muriel ‘should not have been 
charged.’”211  Pena-Muriel then moved to reopen his case, which the IJ 
denied on the basis of the post-departure bar, and the BIA summarily 
affirmed.212 
Pena-Muriel then filed a writ of habeas corpus in the District of 
Massachusetts, which was transferred to the First Circuit under the 
provisions of the REAL ID Act.213  Pena-Muriel’s main argument was that 
IIRIRA’s removal of the post-departure bar on judicial review of removal 
orders214 indicated that the regulatory post-departure bar should also no 
longer be enforced by the Attorney General.215 
Using a Chevron analysis, the court found that IIRIRA was silent on 
whether the administrative post-departure bar was still active.216  Unlike 
some later courts,217 the First Circuit interpreted this silence as pure 
ambiguity, rather than a reflection of congressional intent.218  Moving to 
step two of Chevron, the court rejected Pena-Muriel’s argument that if 
Congress was concerned enough with due process to reinstate post-
departure judicial review, it would have similar concerns about 
administrative action.219  Finding the Attorney General’s interpretation 
 
 206. Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 441–42 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 207. Id. at 440. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. (on the bases of either committing an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006), or a crime of domestic violence, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(i)). 
 210. See Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 440. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id.  The IJ cited 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), which is the post-departure bar 
regulation pertaining specifically to IJs.  This situation appears less commonly than when the 
BIA must invoke its own regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). 
 213. See id. at 440–41. 
 214. See id. at 441.  IIRIRA amended the INA through the deletion of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1105a(c), which banned judicial review of removal orders filed post-departure. See 
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (instituting a new judicial review scheme). 
 215. See Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 441. 
 216. Id. at 441–42. 
 217. See infra notes 222–40; Part II.E–F. 
 218. See Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 441–42. 
 219. See id. (citing Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 15 
(1995) (statement of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel, Immigration & 
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reasonable, the court upheld the post-departure bar.220  The First Circuit’s 
ruling still stands. 
While Chevron analysis had been used as a tool to uphold the bar in 
Pena-Muriel, it would serve the opposite purpose in a case decided by the 
Fourth Circuit, just a few months later.  This subsequent decision seems to 
have staying power, as the most recent decisions have followed its 
approach.221 
Tunbosun Olawale William immigrated to the United States in 1996 and 
became a permanent legal resident.222  The following year, he was arrested 
for receiving a stolen credit card, a violation of Maryland law.223  Soon 
after, INS initiated removal proceedings for committing an aggravated 
felony224 and for committing a crime of moral turpitude.225  The IJ found 
him removable on the moral turpitude charge, and the BIA affirmed.226  In 
July 2005, William was removed from the country.227  In October 2005, 
William filed a writ of coram nobis228 in state court seeking to vacate his 
conviction, which was approved, and in December he filed a motion to 
reopen with the BIA.229  The BIA denied this motion, disclaiming 
jurisdiction under the post-departure bar.230 
A divided Fourth Circuit used Chevron to dismantle the bar, relying on 
three significant grounds.  First, it is noted that the statutory language of 
IIRIRA was silent as to whether departure should bar a motion to reopen.  
For the court, this silence was deafening.231  The statute only says that “[a]n 
alien may file” the motions in question, without making any distinction 
between whether that alien is inside the country or not.232  For the court, 
 
Naturalization Service)).  The court found that Pena-Muriel had misunderstood this 
testimony, finding that IIRIRA had instead instituted a more restrictive judicial review 
scheme than had existed previously, by making it more difficult for an alien to receive a stay 
while appealing to the courts. See Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 442.  As an offset to the fact that 
more aliens would be deported while awaiting judicial review, Congress repealed 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1105a(c) to allow the removed aliens to continue to pursue their cases. See id. at 442. 
 220. Id. at 442–44. 
 221. See infra Part II.E. 
 222. William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 223. Id. 
 224. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (committing an offense 
involving fraud or deceit causing a loss to the victim over $10,000). 
 225. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); William, 499 F.3d at 331 . 
 226. See William, 499 F.3d at 331. 
 227. Id. 
 228. “A writ of error coram nobis traditionally has been brought for an alleged error of 
fact not appearing on the record and lies to the same court that tried the underlying action in 
order that it may correct such error.” Deborah F. Harris, Annotation, Application of Civil or 
Criminal Procedural Rules in Federal Court Proceeding on Motion in Nature of Writ of 
Error Coram Nobis, 53 A.L.R. FED. 762  § 2 (1981) (citation omitted)).  See also Skok v. 
State, 760 A.2d 647, 656 (Md. 2000) (citing Bernard v. State, 65 A.2d 297, 298 (Md. 1949)) 
(describing the Maryland standard for when a writ of coram nobis may be used). 
 229. See William, 499 F.3d at 331. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See id. at 332. 
 232. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2006). 
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this was an unambiguous announcement that physical location does not 
matter.233 
The Fourth Circuit bolstered its analysis with two additional 
considerations.  First, IIRIRA provided for specific restrictions on the right 
to file motions to reopen in other ways,234 but was silent as to whether 
departure mattered.  Thus, the court reasoned that Congress had considered 
imposing such restrictions and decided against it.235 
Secondly, in the 2005 amendments to the INA protecting alien victims of 
domestic violence,236 Congress had added the caveat that for such an alien 
to take advantage of the looser filing restrictions, they would have to be 
physically present.237  This led the court to draw a “negative inference”:  
because the physical presence requirement is present in one part of the 
statute and not the other, it must be true that Congress decided not to 
include it.238  Further, if physical presence was required anyway, 
specifically writing it into the 2005 amendments would render the language 
surplusage, a result the court found impermissible.239  For these reasons, the 
regulation improperly conflicts with the intent of Congress, and thus, the 
BIA cannot rely on it as grounds for their denial to reopen.240 
After these initial rulings, the Supreme Court negatively discussed the 
bar, albeit in dicta.  In Dada, the court was faced with a conflict between 
two portions of IIRIRA.241  In resolving the conflict to allow aliens to 
withdraw a grant of voluntary departure in order to file a motion to reopen 
instead, the court explained that “[a] more expeditious solution to the 
untenable conflict between the voluntary departure scheme and the motion 
to reopen might be to permit an alien who has departed the United States to 
pursue a motion to reopen postdeparture.”242  While the bar was not directly 
challenged in Dada, Chief Justice Roberts took notice of the problem 
 
 233. See William, 499 F.3d at 332. 
 234. See supra notes 53–58. 
 235. See William, 499 F.3d at 333 (citing United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 
(2000)). 
 236. See supra notes 65–66. 
 237. See William, 499 F.3d at 333. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. (citing TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)). 
 240. See id. at 334. 
 241. See id. at 2313–16 (describing how when an alien is granted voluntary departure 
within sixty days following an adverse removal order, they are barred from seeking further 
administrative recourse to reverse the order, but they are also barred from withdrawing the 
voluntary departure grant in order to file a motion to reopen within ninety days). 
 242. Id. at 2320. 
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during oral argument.243  Perhaps this is an indication that the Court may 
find the bar invalid in the future.244 
C.  The Post-departure Bar Strikes Back 
After the decisions in Lin and William, the BIA was faced with the 
problem of how to reconcile these decisions with the long history of the 
post-departure bar.  The BIA expressed strong disagreement with the 
holdings of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in its own subsequent opinion.245  
Andres Armendarez-Mendez was removed to Mexico in 2000 following a 
1995 cocaine possession and distribution conviction.246  He filed a petition 
for review with the Fifth Circuit, which quickly remanded to the BIA in the 
wake of the holding in Lin.247  Subsequently, the BIA decided to address 
both Lin and William. 
In response to Lin, the BIA found that while the ambiguity that the Lin 
court found might be present, the context of the rule as a whole forecloses 
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of that ambiguity.248  A motion to reopen, 
by its very nature, deals with a proceeding that has been closed, and this is 
reflected by the short time deadline after a final order to file such a 
motion249:  “Because the completion of proceedings is a condition 
precedent to the filing of a motion to reopen . . . we cannot reasonably 
interpret 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) as applying only to motions filed by aliens in 
ongoing proceedings.”250  Finally, while the Lin court construed the 
ambiguity in favor of the alien,251 the BIA argued that this should only be 
used as a principle of “last resort”, and thus, traditional Chevron analysis 
would control.252 
 
 243. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307 (2008) 
(No. 06-1181) (“[I]f I thought it important to reconcile the two [statutes], I would be much 
more concerned about that interpretation—that the motion to reopen is automatically 
withdrawn [upon departure] than I would suggest we start incorporating equitable tolling 
rules . . . .”); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported:  Territoriality, 
Finality, and the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 176 n.201 (2010). 
 244. See Rosenbloom, supra note 243, at 176–77 (noting the parallel between the 
successful repeal of the post-departure judicial review bar and a possible repeal of the post-
departure administrative review bar, and the Court’s notice of this parallel in Dada). 
 245. In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646 (B.I.A. 2008).  This means that the 
post-departure bar theoretically has been repealed only when IJs sit in circuits that have 
lifted the bar at the appellate level.  However, in some instances the BIA has continued to 
resist lifting of the bar even in circuits where it has been invalidated at the appellate level 
through alternative means.  This led to the creation of what one writer termed a “phantom 
departure bar.” See Rosenbloom, supra note 243, at 159–64. 
 246. Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 646–47. 
 247. Id. at 646. 
 248. Id. at 651. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id.  This situation can rarely arise in immigration court, however, where aliens who 
have not yet appealed to the BIA file a motion to reopen. See id. at 651–52. 
 251. Id. at 652; Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001)). 
 252. See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 652–53. 
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The BIA went on to attempt to undermine William as well.  In the BIA’s 
view, departure “is a transformative event that fundamentally alters the 
alien’s posture under the law.”253  Once this “transformative event” occurs, 
the alien has the same legal status as any other alien beyond our borders.254  
Thus under immigration law, the duty to protect the borders lies with the 
DHS and not the BIA, as the BIA is not responsible for dealing with aliens 
beyond our borders.255 
Additionally, the BIA rejected the William holding of a negative 
inference dismantling the bar.  IIRIRA section 304(a) was a limited statute, 
only placing restrictions on when such motions can be filed.256  In the 
BIA’s view, there was nothing here suggesting that the existing regulatory 
scheme was to be overridden.257 
While there is some tension between the physical presence requirement 
for motions filed by battered aliens258 and IIRIRA’s silence, the BIA rejects 
the notion that this tension would be enough to repeal the post-departure 
bar.259  Instead, this later requirement is much narrower than the bar as a 
whole, and operates only within the specific context of motions filed by 
battered aliens.260  However, as noted below, many circuits have declined to 
follow the BIA’s reasoning in this case.261   
In a subsequent case, the Tenth Circuit landed on the side of the BIA, 
albeit for different reasons, by using Chevron analysis to find that the bar 
still stood.262  Martin Rosillo-Puga was admitted to the United States from 
Mexico in 1995, and was convicted of battery in Indiana in 1997.263  In 
2003, he was removed to Mexico upon the ruling of an IJ in Colorado, on 
the dual bases of committing an aggravated felony and a crime of domestic 
violence.264  Following his removal, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion 
that battery under Indiana law was not an aggravated felony or a crime of 
domestic violence under immigration law.265  Rosillo-Puga filed a “Motion 
to Reconsider and Rescind Removal Order, or in the Alternative to Reopen 
Proceedings” three and a half years later, under the IJ’s sua sponte 
 
 253. Id. at 656. 
 254. See id. In fact, a deported alien’s legal status may be even worse, because he or she 
is now inadmissible, and if reentering illegally, faces even more onerous criminal sanctions 
than a regular illegal immigrant. 
 255. See id. (“Thus, our inability to entertain motions filed by aliens who have departed 
the United States is not just a matter of administrative convenience . . . .  Removed aliens 
have, by virtue of their departure, literally passed beyond our aid.”). 
 256. Id. at 657. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See supra note 66. 
 259. See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 658–59. 
 260. See id. at 659. 
 261. See infra Part II.D–E. 
 262. Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 263. See id. at 1149. 
 264. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (aggravated felony); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 
(a)(2)(E)(i) (domestic violence). 
 265. See generally Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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authority.266  The IJ refused, and the BIA affirmed, citing a lack of 
jurisdiction under the post-departure bar.267 
The court ultimately sided with the vociferous dissent in William.  
Performing its own Chevron analysis, the Tenth Circuit found that the 
statute was ambiguous for several reasons.268  First, the statute was silent 
about the departure bar.  The court took this to be just that:  silence, and not 
proof of congressional intent.269  Accordingly, because the fact that the 
judicial post-departure bar was repealed by IIRIRA was not enough to find 
that the regulatory post-departure bar was repealed, as the First Circuit had 
previously found.270  Additionally, because the physical presence 
requirement in domestic violence cases came after the passage of IIRIRA, it 
revealed nothing about what Congress was thinking at the time IIRIRA was 
enacted.271  Thus, the statute was ambiguous as to congressional intent. 
Under the second step of Chevron, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the 
William dissent that the agency’s answer was reasonable, meaning it was 
not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”272  The 
regulations addressed the agency’s power of review, not the judiciary’s.273 
Further, it was “inconceivable that Congress would repeal the post-
departure bar, without doing or even saying anything about the forty-year 
history of the [bar].”274  This long history is evidence that the agency’s 
interpretation was indeed the one favored by Congress at the time of 
IIRIRA.275 
The Tenth Circuit would not be the only court to go against William, but 
it provided the most developed analysis of the bar’s validity at that time.276  
However, even the Tenth Circuit would ultimately reverse course a few 
years later.277 
 
 266. Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1149. 
 267. See id. at 1150–51. 
 268. Id. at 1155–58. 
 269. See id. at 1155 (citing William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 341 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(Williams, J., dissenting)) (“Congress often expressly repeals both statutory provisions and 
regulations, and it is reasonable to expect that Congress will speak with greater clarity in 
overruling long-held agency interpretations like the departure bar . . . .” ). 
 270. See Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 441–43 (1st. Cir. 2007). 
 271. Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1155. 
 272. Id. at 1157 (citing William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 335 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
 273. See id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See id. (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 
(1986)). 
 276. Compare Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156–57, with Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 
297–98 (5th Cir. 2009) (agreeing, but deciding the case on procedural grounds), and Zhang 
v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 2010) (agreeing, but expressing reservations). See also 
Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009).  In Mendiola, the 10th Circuit cited 
Rosillo-Puga to extend the application of the bar to a factual situation where 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(d) was involved, and where the petitioner’s motion to reopen was based on prior 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 1309–11. 
 277. See infra notes 353–58. 
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Finally, another possible avenue for the bar’s survival could be a circuit 
decision resting entirely on procedural grounds.  For example, the Fifth 
Circuit indirectly upheld the bar by failing to reach the question at hand.  
Ruben Ovalles immigrated to the United States from the Dominican 
Republic in 1985 and was convicted of attempted possession of drugs under 
Ohio law in 2003.278  The IJ determined that while Ovalles was statutorily 
removable279 for a controlled substance conviction, a separate statute did 
not provide an additional ground for removal because Ovalles did not serve 
jail time.280  Therefore, Ovalles was eligible for cancellation of removal, 
which was granted partly as a result of his long work history and family 
connections.281  DHS appealed, and the BIA overturned, finding that the 
conviction was indeed an aggravated felony, resulting in removal in 
2004.282 
Shortly after, the Supreme Court held that a “first-time conviction for 
simple possession of drugs that is neither an illicit trafficking offense nor a 
federal felony does not constitute an aggravated felony for immigration 
purposes.”283  Ovalles subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, or 
alternatively, a motion to reopen sua sponte in 2007, which the BIA noted 
as untimely.284  However, the BIA based its decision on the post-departure 
bar itself.285 
Upon review, the Fifth Circuit did not explicitly reach the question of the 
bar’s validity, finding that Ovalles’ motion had clearly been filed too 
late.286  In dicta, the court went on to affirm its support for the bar’s 
validity, finding that the BIA had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in 
applying it.287 
Another example of a circuit declining to rule on the validity of the bar 
because of procedural issues is the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Ortega-
Marroquin v. Holder.288  In a decision somewhat similar to Ovalles, the 
court remanded to the BIA to consider the alien’s claim for equitable 
 
 278. Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 279. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (conviction of a controlled substance 
violation); Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 291. 
 280. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  This provision deals with an immigrant’s 
conviction for an aggravated felony.  Because Ovalles did not actually serve any jail time, 
this provision could not apply. See Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 291. 
 281. See Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 291. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. (citing Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006)). 
 284. Id. at 291. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See id. at 295 (finding that a motion to reopen had not been filed until more than 
three years after the final order of removal had been issued, well outside the thirty-day limit 
for motions to reconsider and the ninety-day limit for motions to reopen). 
 287. See id. at 297–98 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Lin and instead finding 
the BIA’s ruling in Armendarez-Mendez as the correct analysis of the question). See 
generally Emma Rebhorn, Note, Ovalles v. Holder:  Better Late than . . . On Time?  The 
Fifth Circuit Avoids Ruling on the Validity of the Postdeparture Bar, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1347 
(2010) (discussing the details of the case). 
 288. 640 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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tolling, as he had missed the ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to 
reopen.289 
The Fifth Circuit ultimately confirmed Ovalles’s foreshadowing dicta 
with its ruling in Toora v. Holder.290  However, the bar did not survive for 
very long in the Fifth Circuit; it was ultimately struck down in 2012 using 
Chevron analysis.291 
Following the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Rosillo-Puga,292 another new 
base of attack against the post-departure bar emerged, setting the stage for 
further invalidations of the post-departure bar, in contrast with some of the 
previous decisions. 
D.  Union Pacific:  A New Weapon Against the Bar 
The Seventh Circuit took the post-departure bar analysis in a new 
direction with its ruling in Marin-Rodriguez.  While ultimately agreeing 
with the Fourth Circuit against the bar, the court reached that result by a 
very different path.293 
Jose Concepcion Marin-Rodriguez entered the United States illegally in 
1988 and stayed out of trouble until being convicted for using fake 
documents to obtain employment under a pretense of citizenship in 2005.294  
He moved for cancellation of removal before the IJ, who demanded that he 
submit his fingerprints to be eligible for that relief in accordance with 
federal regulations.295  Marin-Rodriguez failed to comply, and the IJ 
ordered his removal.296  While his appeal to the BIA was pending, Marin-
Rodriguez finally submitted his fingerprints and asked for a remand to the 
IJ for reconsideration, which was denied.297  He then filed a motion for 
reconsideration, stating that a motion for remand filed during a pending 
appeal cannot be untimely.298  The BIA agreed and remanded, but the DHS 
asked the BIA to reconsider because Marin-Rodriguez had already been 
removed.299  The BIA granted the DHS’s motion and cancelled the 
remand.300 
The Seventh Circuit overturned this decision, but not because of 
Chevron.  Instead, the court found that the BIA based its decision on a lack 
 
 289. See id. at 819–21. 
 290. 603 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010).  In Toora, the Fifth Circuit upheld the post-departure 
bar in a case where the alien had departed the United States after the initiation of removal 
proceedings, but before a deportation order was issued. See id. at 283, 286–87. 
 291. Garcia Carias v. Holder, No. 11-60550, 2012 WL 4458228, at *6 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 
2012). 
 292. Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 293. Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 591–92 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 294. Id.  
 295. Id. at 592 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d) (2011)). 
 296. Id. 
 297. See id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. 
 300. See id. 
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of jurisdiction, and “[a]s a rule about subject-matter jurisdiction, 
§ 1003.2(d) is untenable.”301 
The court found that nothing passed since 1996 allows the BIA to say 
that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on cases that can affect the legal rights of 
those who have been removed.302  First, under the new ruling in Union 
Pacific, the court noted that an agency is unable to contract its own 
jurisdiction.303  Second, the court agreed with the holdings in Coyt v. 
Holder304 and Madrigal v. Holder305 that the post-departure bar should not 
apply when the alien is removed involuntarily.306  Under Union Pacific, if 
the BIA believes that the regulation limits its jurisdiction it would be 
inconsistent to allow the BIA to limit its own jurisdiction by taking an 
action to involuntarily remove an alien.307 
The logic in Marin-Rodriguez has proven powerful, as it was soon 
accepted by the Sixth Circuit in Pruidze and later the Second Circuit in 
Luna.  The Sixth Circuit held that Pruidze’s post-departure motion to 
reopen could not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the BIA following 
the redocketing of his criminal conviction.308  The court relied upon Marin-
Rodriguez in finding that Union Pacific barred a waiving of an agency’s 
own jurisdiction.309 
Further, in dicta, the Sixth Circuit seemed to move away from using 
Chevron to solve this problem.  While first noting the historic debate 
between Justices Brennan and Scalia about whether Chevron deference 
applies to an agency’s self-determination of its jurisdiction,310 the court 
 
 301. Id. at 593. 
 302. See id. at 594. 
 303. See Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 594; supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text. 
 304. 593 F.3d 902, 905–07 (9th Cir. 2010).  Another point to note about Coyt is that the 
Ninth Circuit used a different analysis from Lin, instead relying on Chevron. See id. at 905–
07.  The court held that it would be counter to the statutory scheme of IIRIRA to allow the 
government to cut off a pending motion to reopen by forcibly removing the immigrant. See 
id. at 907.  The court reasoned that allowing the government to do this would undo the idea 
of granting a statutory right to file these motions in the first place. See id. 
 305. 572 F.3d 239, 243–45 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 306. See Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 594. 
 307. See id. 
 308. Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 239, 245 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 309. See id. at 239 (“On this statutory slate, the agency may not disclaim jurisdiction to 
handle a motion to reopen that Congress empowered it to resolve.”). 
 310. See id. at 237 (noting that the question first arose in Miss. Power & Light Co. v. 
Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988), and has yet to be resolved).  Justice Scalia, 
in his concurrence, took the view that an agency should receive Chevron deference when 
interpreting its own jurisdiction for three reasons:  they have general expertise; Congress 
would expect agencies to exercise their expertise to answer these questions; and courts find 
difficulty in separating jurisdictional issues from nonjurisdictional ones. See Nathan 
Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence:  Chevron Deference, Agency 
Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1507–08 (2009) (citing Miss. 
Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381–82 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)).  Meanwhile, in dissent in the same case, Justice Brennan argued for a more 
moderate approach, only allowing for deference when an agency’s interpretation confines 
the scope of authority “to the areas Congress intended it to occupy.” Id. at 1509–10 (quoting 
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declined to answer this question, as it was unnecessary following Union 
Pacific.311  The court went on to say that even under Chevron, the BIA 
would not be able to do this.312  Essentially, Chevron is used to defer to an 
agency when it fills statutory gaps, not when it creates new ones, “and in 
this instance Congress left no gap to fill when it empowered the agency to 
consider all motions to reopen filed by an alien.”313 
An example of a circuit holding differently after Union Pacific is the 
Second Circuit in Zhang, where the court upheld the BIA’s position 
supporting the post-departure bar.314  The IJ found the asylum claim of an 
immigrant frivolous, with the BIA summarily affirming.315  Zhang was 
ultimately removed following denial of a stay of removal, but the BIA—
seemingly unaware of this—granted his motion to reopen shortly after.316  
After this fact came to light, the IJ terminated the case, with the BIA 
affirming and vacating its earlier order.317 
The court did not apply Chevron to this question, and instead rested on 
the framework that legal questions decided by the BIA are reviewed de 
novo, and its regulatory interpretations are owed deference unless plainly 
erroneous.318  Because the framework is different in this example, the 
jurisdictional problems raised in the cases following Union Pacific were not 
in play for the court.319  Essentially, the court found that the interpretation 
was not erroneous but not without expressing some serious misgivings.320  
Some of these misgivings include the Seventh Circuit’s concern with how 
forcible removal can constitute a withdrawal of any pending motions made 
 
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386 (1988) (Brennan, 
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 311. See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237–41. 
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jurisdictional one.”). 
 313. Id. 
 314. Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 655 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 315. See id. at 653. 
 316. See id. at 654 (noting how the BIA exercised its sua sponte authority to reopen the 
case just two days after Zhang had been removed to China). 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 660.  The court cited Second Circuit cases that are derivative of Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997), for this framework. Zhang, 617 F.3d at 660.  While the 
court noted later that they were not using a Chevron analysis “[a]nd petitioner has not argued 
that the manner in which the Attorney General has chosen to define the BIA’s jurisdiction 
conflicts with the INA or leads to some sort of interpretive problem under [Chevron],” this 
analysis bears some clear similarities to a Chevron analysis, mainly in applying the 
erroneous standard to the agency’s interpretation. See id. at 665.  This difference arose 
because, in other cases, petitioners are challenging the denial of jurisdiction over a motion 
explicitly granted by the INA (for example, in Marin-Rodriguez, a motion for 
reconsideration), while here, Zhang’s challenge came under the regulation promulgated by 
the Attorney General that granted the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen. See id. at 663–64. 
 319. Id. at 664 (explaining how these facts do not deal with the jurisdiction granted by the 
IIRIRA, but rather by regulations promulgated by the Attorney General). 
 320. See id. at 660 (“To be sure, the BIA’s construction is anything but airtight . . . .  
Were we writing on a blank slate, we might reach a different conclusion . . . .”).  However, 
the court found that the slate was not blank, and instead relied on Armendarez-Mendez. Id. 
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by an alien321 and questions about whether such a withdrawal is truly 
“jurisdictional.”322  The court’s clear discomfort with the BIA’s stance 
possibly set the stage for the Second Circuit’s later decision in Luna.  In 
Luna, the Second Circuit somewhat changed course by applying the 
reasoning of Union Pacific to strike down the post-departure bar.323 
The court found that the BIA could not “contract” its given jurisdiction to 
hear a motion to reopen, because “‘the power to establish jurisdictional bars 
resides with Congress.’”324  Further, “every indication points to the fact that 
Congress did not intend to create a jurisdictional bar for motions to reopen 
filed by an alien in the United States who is later removed from the United 
States.”325  Thus, “[t]he BIA must exercise its full jurisdiction to adjudicate 
a statutory motion to reopen by an alien who is removed or otherwise 
departs the United States before or after filing the motion.”326  While 
declining to repeal the bar in every possible factual context,327 the Luna 
decision represents another strong attack on the bar’s national acceptance, 
as the Second Circuit now seems to have made a strong statement for 
abandoning it. 
Even the BIA has backed off their stance in Armendarez-Mendez, albeit 
only in very limited circumstances.  In In re Bulnes-Nolasco,328 the BIA 
found that the application of the IJ post-departure bar would be unfair in 
cases of in absentia deportations.329  Essentially, this would give the bar 
“greater force than it is entitled to by law”330 because the alien would be 
unfairly denied notice.331  Therefore, it appears that even the BIA may be 
backing off, at least in rare circumstances. 
Following these holdings, it is unclear which tool is more powerful in 
dismantling the bar:  Chevron or Union Pacific.  Recent rulings by the 
Third, Tenth, Eleventh and Fifth Circuits may provide an answer. 
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 322. See id. 
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 326. Luna, 637 F.3d at 102. 
 327. See id. 
 328. 25 I. & N. Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 2009). 
 329. See id. at 59–60. 
 330. Id. at 60. 
 331. See id. at 59. 
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E.  Prestol Espinal:  A Return to Chevron? 
When the Third Circuit finally heard a post-departure bar challenge in 
2011, it decided to break course from the more recent decisions in Marin-
Rodriguez and Pruidze by centering its analysis on Chevron as opposed to 
Union Pacific.  Prestol Espinal was the first case since Union Pacific to 
choose the Chevron route as its primary line of attack.332  Ramon Prestol 
Espinal, after being born in the Dominican Republic, lived in the United 
States from 1982–2009.333  In 2009, he was entered into removal 
proceedings following convictions in 2004 for controlled substance 
possession and violation of a protective order.334  Prestol Espinal admitted 
the charges, but he filed for asylum and withholding of removal.335  The IJ 
denied these applications for relief, and the BIA affirmed, with Prestol 
Espinal being removed shortly after.336  Once he was removed, Prestol 
Espinal filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied based on lack of 
jurisdiction under the post-departure bar.337 
The Third Circuit expressly adopted the Chevron-based conclusions of 
William338 and gave support to similar findings by the Sixth339 and Ninth 
Circuits.340  Essentially, the Third Circuit found that Congress spoke clearly 
in IIRIRA, by failing to distinguish between the rights of aliens who were 
inside the country and those that were outside.341  Additionally, the court 
noted the holdings in Pruidze and Marin-Rodriguez based on Union Pacific, 
but because the court used Chevron, they were not dispositive in this 
case.342  Finally, the Third Circuit referred back to the Supreme Court’s 
seeming disapproval of the bar in dicta.343  The court went further, using 
language that could have implications for future Chevron analysis.   It 
asserted that the government “manufactures” an ambiguity from 
congressional failure to specifically enumerate each possible exception344:  
“That approach would create an ‘ambiguity’ in almost all statutes, 
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 335. See id. 
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necessitating deference to nearly all agency determinations.”345  Ultimately, 
the Third Circuit came down on the side of the dicta analysis in Pruidze, 
ruling that there was no statutory gap that needed to be filled by the 
Attorney General.346 
Finally, the court examined the statutory scheme of IIRIRA as a whole to 
find no basis for the post-departure bar.  Citing the same principle as 
William, the Third Circuit found that the presence of other provisions in the 
statute, such as the new procedural requirements, indicated that Congress 
considered the idea of a post-departure bar and decided not to include it.347  
This was bolstered by the fact that Congress had been aware of the post-
departure limitations and decided not to include them in IIRIRA.348  Next, 
the court pointed to the repeal of judicial review in IIRIRA and the 
codification of the right to reopen as evidence that Congress intended 
IIRIRA to possibly allow aliens who deserved to stay under the law more 
opportunities for review.349  Finally, as other courts have mentioned, the 
existence of a physical presence requirement in extended-time motions filed 
by victims of domestic violence, indicates that the post-departure bar was 
not a background rule under IIRIRA.350  For these reasons, the court found 
that the post-departure bar was invalid in this situation for conflicting with 
IIRIRA.351 
Prestol Espinal thus illustrates a return to a Chevron-based analysis for 
evaluating the post-departure bar.  The Tenth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits 
would soon follow suit. 
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 348. See Prestol Espinal, 653 F.3d at 222. 
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Id. (quoting Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 350. Id. at 223–24. 
 351. Id. at 224.  In a subsequent case, the Third Circuit upheld the validity of the post-
departure bar when the BIA refused to hear a motion to reopen under its sua sponte 
authority. See Desai v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., No. 11-3229, 2012 WL 3570718 (3d Cir. Aug. 
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jurisdiction to hear post-departure motions. See id. at *3. 
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F.  2012:  A Year of Further Steps for Chevron 
In 2012, the Tenth Circuit reversed and repealed its previously strong 
stance that the post-departure bar was valid.352  Jesus Contreras-Bocanegra, 
a lawful permanent resident originally from Mexico, was convicted of 
attempted possession of a controlled substance in 1991, receiving a 
suspended jail sentence.353  In 2004, he was detained by DHS after 
reentering the United States following a visit to his native Mexico and 
placed in removal proceedings.354  The IJ directed that he be removed, with 
the BIA affirming.355  After being removed to Mexico, Contreras-
Bocanegra promptly filed a motion to reopen grounded in ineffective 
assistance of counsel.356  This motion was denied by the BIA because of the 
post-departure bar, and Contreras-Bocanegra’s subsequent petition for 
review to the Tenth Circuit was also denied by relying on the circuit’s 
strong precedent in favor of the bar.357 
Upon rehearing the case en banc, the Tenth Circuit drastically reversed 
course from its prior decisions.  Employing the Chevron analysis, the court 
found that Congress spoke clearly in the plain language of the statute, the 
structure of the statute, and the overall structure and purpose of IIRIRA, so 
that the post-departure bar could not stand.358 
This decision may well have been the biggest blow yet to the post-
departure bar, as the Tenth Circuit previously had a strong stance in favor of 
keeping it.359  Further, this represented another “victory” for Chevron 
analysis over Union Pacific.  A few months later, the Eleventh Circuit 
would join the fray, also using Chevron to disable the bar.360 
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Jian Le Lin illegally immigrated to the United States from China in 1992 
and was placed into removal proceedings for that illegal entry in 1998.361  
His asylum request was denied, and he was ordered removed by an IJ, with 
the BIA affirming in 2002.362  In 2010, he was still in the United States 
when he filed a motion to reopen based on a new request for asylum, 
involving changed country conditions.363  He also requested that the BIA 
reopen proceedings via its sua sponte authority.364  Lin’s requests were 
denied, and he was removed in April 2011, with the BIA deciding that his 
motion to reopen was withdrawn because of the post-departure bar.365  Lin 
then filed a petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit.366 
The Eleventh Circuit relied on Chevron analysis to find that Congress 
spoke clearly in IIRIRA, so that the post-departure bar was invalid.367  
Similar to the analysis in Contreras-Bocanegra, the court reasoned that “the 
plain language of the statute, the statutory structure, and the amendment 
scheme . . . point to one conclusion:  IIRIRA guarantees an alien the right to 
file one motion to reopen, and the departure bar impermissibly undercuts 
that right.”368   
Finally, in the most recent word on the bar, the Fifth Circuit held the bar 
invalid under Chevron, albeit with a slightly different analysis than that 
used by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.369  This represents another 
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important change in the status of the bar, as the Fifth Circuit had previously 
upheld its validity in certain factual circumstances.370  Yet again, in 2012, 
Chevron prevailed over both the post-departure bar, and Union Pacific. 
In summary, the number of circuits that have repealed the bar, at least in 
the factual circumstances that have been presented to them, is nine.  Of 
these nine, those primarily relying on the Chevron analysis are the Third,371 
Fourth,372 Fifth,373 Tenth,374 Ninth375 and Eleventh Circuits.376  Those 
circuits relying primarily on the Union Pacific reasoning are the Second,377 
Sixth,378 and Seventh.379  Additionally, the Supreme Court wrote in favor 
of repeal in dicta.380  Meanwhile, the First Circuit continues to uphold the 
bar,381 while this issue remains open in the Eighth382 and D.C. Circuits.383 
As time marches on, it seems likely that the post-departure bar will 
continue to come closer to its death, as the recent trend has been for circuits 
to invalidate the bar.  This has been the case even when one circuit, the 
Tenth, had previously issued two strong rulings in favor of the bar’s 
validity.384 
III.  WHERE TWO FORKS OF THE ROAD MEET AGAIN 
The issue of how exactly the bar may ultimately be struck down is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  How the bar will meet its end—whether the 
circuits ultimately reach agreement, the Supreme Court finally decides the 
issue, or Congress amends the statutory language to either codify the 
regulatory post-departure bar or eliminate it once and for all—is unclear.385  
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However, Part III frames a resolution in terms of a possible Supreme Court 
ruling or agreement among all the circuits.  This Part will argue that it 
ultimately does not matter whether the circuits or the Supreme Court use 
Chevron or Union Pacific to overturn the post-departure bar, because using 
either base of reasoning to strike the bar is in line with three recent and 
prevalent norms in immigration law. 
Parts III.A and III.B of this Note examine the two primary bases for 
overturning the post-departure bar that have been applied by the circuits:  
Chevron and Union Pacific, respectively.  Next, Part III.C explains why it 
does not matter which base emerges as the dominant reasoning for 
eliminating the bar, as either base would help satisfy three prevalent norms 
in immigration cases decided by the Supreme Court. 
A.  Anti-Chevron:  An Agency Denied 
Currently, it seems evident that the overwhelming trend among circuit 
courts is to lift the bar.  As detailed in Parts I and II, this is indicated by the 
number of courts that have chosen to remove the bar, either through the use 
of Chevron analysis or an application of Union Pacific. 
A more open question than whether or not the bar will be lifted is what 
basis the courts will use to ground their reasoning.  Two main bases have 
emerged for the invalidation of the bar.386  The first is Chevron analysis, 
where the silence of IIRIRA clearly indicates congressional intent for the 
bar to be repealed.  One might call this an “anti-Chevron” analysis because 
the doctrine is invoked as a reason not to defer to the agency.  The other 
basis is the application of Union Pacific, which is part of a line of cases 
where the Supreme Court has attempted to clearly delineate between 
“jurisdictional” and “claim-processing” rules, as a way to avoid “drive-by 
jurisdictional rulings.”387 
These two bases, while producing the same result of repealing the bar,388 
could arguably be seen as being in some tension.  While both bases 
technically deal with the idea that an agency should take jurisdiction over 
some matter,389 Chevron is actually applied in this case to take a decision 
away from an agency by approximating congressional intent, whereas 
Union Pacific is being used to protect a quasi-judicial function that the BIA 
is trying to relinquish.390  While application of Chevron forces the BIA and 
IJ to at least consider motions filed post-departure, it does so by going 
against regulations promulgated by the technical supervisor of the EOIR, 
 
judicial inefficiency over this circuit conflict. See id. at 307–08.  Second, Bonilla argues that 
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the Attorney General.391  In this way, Chevron functions opposite to how it 
was intended, by overriding an agency’s own regulations.  Thus, perhaps it 
could be described as an anti-Chevron application. 
The application of Chevron to undermine an administrative regulation 
that explicitly declines jurisdiction seems to fly in the face of what Chevron 
was intended to do.  There are two views as to Chevron’s motivating 
purpose.  First, that Chevron is designed to enforce the intent of Congress 
by preventing judicial interference with statutes that delegate power to the 
agencies.392  Second, Chevron is a way to funnel complicated matters to the 
agencies who have the best expertise in interpreting complex statutes.393  
Chevron appears to work differently in this context.  The agency has 
already decided to interpret the statute to decline jurisdiction over these 
motions,394 but courts are using Chevron to dismantle these statutory 
interpretations, rather than giving deference to the agency.395  In this way, 
the normal presumption of Chevron is flipped on its head within the context 
of the post-departure bar. 
B.  Union Pacific:  Another Means to the Same End 
The ruling of Union Pacific is not in tension with the anti-Chevron 
analysis in the post-departure bar context.  Union Pacific fits into a line of 
cases where the Supreme Court is attempting to eliminate the problem of 
“drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”396  It may be arguable that Union Pacific 
and traditional Chevron analysis are in some tension, because the Union 
Pacific line of cases deals with reversing an agency’s attempt to decline its 
own jurisdiction,397 while Chevron is seemingly intended to give rise to an 
agency’s interpretation, as opposed to that of the courts.398 
However, when Chevron analysis in this context is viewed as a kind of 
anti-Chevron, the use of the two bases seems more logical.  Both are 
applied in order to undo an agency’s decision not to take jurisdiction over 
the case.399  Both are also applied to better effectuate the perceived intent of 
Congress in passing IIRIRA.400  Most importantly, these two bases fit 
within the overarching norms that are at the forefront of several recent 
Supreme Court immigration cases.401 
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C.  Why Either Answer is Correct 
Ultimately, it does not matter whether Chevron or Union Pacific emerges 
as the primary reason for invalidation of the post-departure bar.  Both bases 
provide the same favorable outcome to immigrants seeking to file post-
departure motions.402  More importantly, either basis satisfies a number of 
norms that have emerged in recent cases, suggesting that invalidation of the 
post-departure bar is the correct result, when compared to the rest of 
immigration law.  These three principles are:  (1) the strong presumption in 
favor of judicial review of administrative action; (2) the “clear statement 
rule”; and (3) that immigrants should have a robust opportunity to fight the 
harsh consequences of deportation.403 
Together, these three principles are served by both the anti-Chevron 
application and the precedential power of Union Pacific.  The Chevron 
application here serves the principle in favor of judicial review by reversing 
the Attorney General, and using the power of judicial review to force at 
least some consideration of the proffered motions.404  While the review here 
is administrative instead of judicial, it does constitute one further bite at the 
apple for immigrants, even if they have already departed the American 
borders.  In this way, the third principle is also served, as immigrants 
receive that extra bite at the apple. 
Additionally, the clear statement rule is served by this anti-Chevron 
application.  The circuits reach this outcome by determining at the first step 
of Chevron that IIRIRA’s silence on the post-departure bar indicates that 
Congress did not intend for it to exist anymore.405  This seems to be a 
derivation of the clear statement rule as described in St. Cyr.406  Essentially, 
if Congress did not clearly state that such a restrictive provision were to 
exist, the administrative agencies would be violating congressional intent 
by promulgating and implementing one.  Thus, a “clear statement” of the 
post-departure bar would be necessary in the eyes of several circuits.407 
Union Pacific also serves these three principles in reaching the same 
result as the Chevron circuits.  The first principle is met by use of judicial 
power to force the EOIR to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent allowed 
by Congress.408  Again, while this outcome results in more administrative, 
as opposed to judicial, review the court is using judicial review as an 
administrative decision in a manner that is beneficial to immigrants. 
Additionally, Union Pacific serves the clear statement rule.  In finding 
that Congress clearly delegated power to hear these cases, the circuits lend 
support to the rule.  After all, if Congress had wanted to strip the circuits of 
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their jurisdiction here, it would have clearly stated so.409  By requiring a 
clear statement that such jurisdiction does not exist, the Union Pacific 
circuits have enforced this norm in favor of immigrant rights. 
Finally, the third principle is met by the holdings of the Union Pacific 
circuits.  By blocking the BIA and IJs from shirking their own 
congressionally-granted jurisdiction, removed aliens are given another shot 
at possible reopening or reconsideration of an adverse ruling against 
them.410  In this way, every opportunity to avoid the harsh consequences of 
removal is explored. 
These two bases can work together to properly dismantle the post-
departure bar forever.  As these three principles have been reinforced by the 
Supreme Court in the last decade,411 the recent majority of rulings at the 
circuit level in favor of dismantling the bar also serve these trends, albeit 
indirectly.412  In this way, our immigration adjudicative authorities can 
properly serve both congressional intent and the rights of removed 
immigrants. 
CONCLUSION 
The post-departure bar serves to prevent the filing of motions to reopen 
or reconsider by aliens who have already been physically removed from the 
United States.413  After years of standing unchallenged, the bar’s validity 
has been questioned by multiple circuit courts in recent years.414 
There are three main outcomes that the circuits have relied upon in ruling 
on the bar’s validity.  First, there is the use of Chevron analysis to dismantle 
the bar.415  Second, there is the use of Chevron analysis to reach the 
opposite conclusion that the bar should stand.416  Finally, the ruling in 
Union Pacific has been cited for the principle that an agency such as the 
EOIR cannot limit its own jurisdiction by refusing to hear a motion.417 
When looking at the “scorecard” of circuit rulings, the majority of 
circuits have decided to invalidate the post-departure bar.418  This trend 
seems likely to continue because of three norms that are prevalent in recent 
Supreme Court immigration cases:  (1) the idea that administrative action 
should be subject to judicial review, even in the immigration context; 
(2) the “clear statement rule”; and (3) the idea that immigrants should have 
every opportunity to fight the harsh consequences of removal.419 
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Ultimately, it does not matter whether circuits rely on Chevron or Union 
Pacific to strike down the bar.  Both sets of reasoning can operate to serve 
the three norms above.420  Thus, the post-departure bar’s invalidation is 
consistent with the direction of the rest of immigration law.421 
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